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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal by virtue of 
a timely notice of appeal filed by defendant Don R. Gaskill 
(hereinafter "Mr. Gaskill") pursuant to Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, from a final judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, and pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Statement of Issue. Whether it was reversible error for the 
district court to affirm the commissioner's conclusion that it is 
inequitable on these facts to allow Mr. Gaskill to assert the 
defenses of waiver or estoppel? (Record at 90f 102f 114). 
Standard of Appellate Review. Because the court's 
conclusion barring assertion of waiver and estoppel is based in 
equity, it is the prerogative of this court to review both the 
facts and the lawf and to overturn the district court's ruling 
where the evidence clearly preponderates against the trial 
court's conclusion. Ross v. Ross, 592 P.2d 600, 602 (Utah 1979). 
The court concluded that Mrs. Gaskill did not waive her right to 
alimony. Because this conclusion is a question of law, the trial 
court is accorded no particular deference. Its conclusions are 
reviewed by this court for correctness. Kelson v. Salt Lake 
County, 784 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1989). The court of appeals will not 
disturb the trial court's findings of fact on the issue of the 
legal doctrine of waiver, unless such findings are clearly 
erroneous. Hinkley v. Hinkley, 815 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Utah App. 
1991) (citation omitted). "Findings of fact will be regarded as 
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clearl y erroneous only i f they are so ] acking i n support as to be 
against the clear weight of the evidence.'" Id. (citation 
j i. Statement of Issue. Whether ~ *~ —*** ^eversiblo nrror for the 
district court to deny an amendment • * ^ ^:^*,^ decree nunc 
pro tunc based 01 i fax lure; l.o stinw *"  ul 
circumstances not original ] y contemplated in the decree, 0:1 
whethei: the appr opria te standard ior a nunr pro tunc order :i s a 
finding of "good cause" pursuant -t-^  ut«ih Code Ann. l? i(J-4a 1 , 
Standard of Appellate Review, Because this issue presents a 
< | I H - \ S 1 i n m i I I iii.< , I l i i II 1 mi i l l i ' i H I i I ' 1 1 M 111J i 1 mi * I ui) 1 uii!) n 1  o ii< c o r d e d 
no particular deference and ai: e reviewed by thi s coin: t for 
correctness. Kelson v. Salt Lake County, 7 84 P.2d 1152 (Utah 
• ) . 
ill. Statement of Issue, If Mrs. Cask 1 1] i s entitled to a 
judgment, whether the judgement should be vacated and the trial 
court instructed 1.1. enter judgment for the appropriate amount. 
Standard of Appellate Review, Finding*- r ; 1,4 be 
1: egar 
suppor * > : •• -, i t m e ciear weight r, \.he evidence 
Hinklev v. Hinkley, 815 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Utah App. 1991) 
) . ' • • • • 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-4a-l: 
A .-;;:$ having jurisdiction may, upon its finding of good 
cause '*.--.;: aivina °f such notice as may be ordered, enter an 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
order nunc pro tunc in a matter relating to marriage, 
divorce, legal separation or annulment of marriage. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-12-22: 
Within eight years: 
An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the 
United States of or any state or territory within the United 
States. 
An action to enforce any liability due or to become due, 
for failure to provide support or maintenance for dependent 
children. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 15-1-1(2): 
Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different 
rate of interest, the legal rate of interest for the loan or 
forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action shall be 
10% per annum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff/Appellee Mrs. Gaskill obtained a judgment in the 
amount of $81,239.36 against Defendant/Appellant Mr. Gaskill for 
delinquent alimony on August 28, 1992. The Decree of Divorce was 
originally entered December 30, 1976. In lieu of formal service 
Mr. Gaskill was sent a consent and waiver and a copy of the 
complaint. Mr. Gaskill altered the consent and waiver to omit 
his consent to entry of a default judgment on the issue of 
alimony. Mr. Gaskill was given no further notice of the 
proceedings or entry of judgment. 
In 1978, after being served with an order to show cause for 
failure to pay alimony, Mr. Gaskill immediately raised the 
defense of mistake or error in entry of the judgment, pursuant to 
Rule 60(b)(7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Mrs. Gaskill 
failed to respond to his defense. The court ordered both parties 
3 
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to file briefs. Thereafter, Mrs. Gaskill failed to submit a 
memorandum in support of her petition as requested by the court, 
and the matter was dismissed seven months later for failure to 
prosecute. Mrs. Gaskill did not seek relief from the dismissal. 
Mrs. Gaskill has not brought another action to enforce the 
judgment for over twelve years since she allowed the action in 
1978 to be dismissed. 
Proceedings and Disposition Below 
This is an appeal from a judgment in the amount of 
$81,239.36. The judgment is based upon nonpayment of alimony in 
[ the amount of $450 per month for eight years or 96 months. All 
evidence was submitted based upon the record and affidavits. The 
commissioner made his ruling by reviewing affidavits and 
memorandum. The District Court summarily affirmed. 
Statement of Facts 
1. Mrs. Gaskill filed for divorce from Mr. Gaskill in the 
Utah Third Judicial District Court, on or about September 8, 
1976. (Record at 2-4). 
2. Mr. Gaskill and Mrs. Gaskill were separated at the time 
Mrs. Gaskill commenced the divorce action in Utah. Mr. Gaskill 
lived in California, and Mrs. Gaskill lived in Utah. (Record at 
2, 18). 
3. Paragraph 8 of the complaint stated, "That the 
defendant pay the plaintiff $700.00 per month alimony for a 
period of 30 months, after which time the defendant has agreed to 
pay the plaintiff $450.00 per month for the remainder of her 
4 
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life, providing, however, that should the plaintiff remarry all 
alimony payments shall cease forthwith." (Record at 3) (emphasis 
added). 
4. Mr. Gaskill was sent a "Consent and Waiver" form in 
that proceeding, to which he made the alteration, "Omit #8 on 
Complaint," in his own handwriting and added his signature, on or 
about September 8, 1976. (Record at 6). 
5. Mr. Gaskill signed the consent and waiver with the 
understanding that paragraph 8, concerning alimony, would be 
omitted. (Record at 26). 
6. The consent and waiver form does not state that 
defendant has, or knows that he should have, consulted with legal 
counsel before signing the waiver and consent form. (Record at 
6). 
7. Mr. Gaskill at no time submitted his person or intended 
to submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court for 
purposes of considering or entering a money judgment against him. 
(Record at 19, paragraph 7). 
8. The introductory paragraph of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in support of the divorce decree states that, 
"plaintiff having filed an Appearance and Waiver authorizing the 
entry of Default as per the provisions in the complaint; the same 
was taken note of by the court and the default entered." (Record 
at 8) (emphasis added). 
9. Despite Mr. Gaskill's alteration of the consent and 
waiver form to omit the paragraph requesting alimony, the court 
5 
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ignored the alteration and proceeded to enter a decree of 
divorcef including alimony terms substantially similar to those 
set forth in the complaint, which were excepted by Mr. Gaskill. 
(Record at 11, paragraph 4). 
10. Subsequent to Mr. Gaskill's alteration and return of 
the consent and waiver, no notice was given to him that the court 
would nevertheless hear, consider or decide the claim for 
alimony, and, consequently, he did not have the opportunity to 
appear and oppose the claim. (Record at 19, paragraphs 8 and 9). 
11. Mr. Gaskill was not notified of the entry of judgment 
in the divorce action, and his obligation to pay alimony under 
the terms of the divorce decree as rendered by the court. 
(Record at 19). 
12. Approximately twenty-one months after entry of 
judgment, on or about September 8, 1978, Mrs. Gaskill filed a 
motion for order to show cause why Mr. Gaskill should not be held 
in contempt for failure to pay alimony. (Record at 14-15). 
13. Mrs. Gaskill claims that Mr. Gaskill knew of the 
judgment before the 1978 order to show cause, alleging that she 
repeatedly asked him to "provide financial assistance" to her and 
to "pay the alimony as ordered by the court." (Record at 59, 64, 
paragraph 21) 
14. Mr. Gaskill claims that he first learned that the 
decree of divorce included a judgment against him for alimony on 
or about September 15, 1978, when he was served with an order to 
show cause in the matter. (Record at 16, 19-20). 
6 
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15. Immediately upon being served with a motion for 
contempt in 1978, Mr. Gaskill took steps to bring this matter to 
the attention of the court by retaining counsel. (Record at 19-
20) 
16. On October 31f 1978, Mr. Gaskill responded and 
contended that he wrote "omit #8 on Complaint" on the consent and 
waiver. He contended that the alimony provisions of the decree 
should be set aside as provided by Rule 60(b)(7), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. He also raised the issue of subject matter 
jurisdiction. (Record at 19). 
17. The matter was scheduled to be heard on 21 November, 
1978, at 3:30 p.m. (Record at 22, 24). 
18. Mrs. Gaskill did not respond to Mr. Gaskill's 
"Affidavit in Support of Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce." 
19. At the 21 November, 1978, hearing the court requested 
the parties to submit memoranda. (Record at 24). 
20. Approximately seven months later, July 2, 1979, the 
court, by minute entry, stated "This matter having heretofore 
been heard by this court and taken under advisement. Court now 
states neither party having filed the memorandum ordered by the 
court, the petition is denied without prejudice." (Record at 
25). 
21. The record shows that Mrs. Gaskill took no steps to set 
aside the court's dismissal of her action. (Record in its 
entirety). 
22. Mrs. Gaskill claims that after the dismissal of the 
7 
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1978 action she did try to collect alimony from Mr. Gaskill. 
(Record at 45, paragraph 2, and 64-65, paragraphs 6 and 7). 
23. Mrs. Gaskill admits that several years passed without 
any communication between the parties. (Record at 64, paragraph 
8). 
24. Mrs. Gaskill admits that, when the parties have been 
together at various time since the 1978 action, she has never 
attempted to address the issue of alimony. (Record at 65, 
paragraph 11). 
25. Mr. Gaskill claims that subsequent to the dismissal of 
the 1978 action Mrs. Gaskill never made mention of any intent to 
collect alimony, and cites several occasions when the parties 
have seen each other over the years, at which times she did not 
mention alimony. (Record at 27, paragraph 5, 73-74, paragraphs 
5 , 6 , 7 and 8). 
26. The record shows there has been no action in this case 
for twelve (12) years. (Record in its entirety). 
27. On August 19, 1991, more than 12 years after dismissal 
of the action in 1978, Mrs Gaskill took the judgment to the State 
of Washington, claiming delinquent alimony. (Record at 79). 
28. Mrs. Gaskill knew that Mr. Gaskill was employed and 
believed that he had the financial ability to pay alimony. 
(Record at 63, paragraph 3) 
29. On December 10, 1991, Mr. Gaskill filed a verified 
petition to modify decree, and a motion for order to show cause 
why the court should not certify to the court in the State of 
8 
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Washington that certain issues were before the Utah court 
concerning the validity of the decree, whether the decree should 
be amended nunc pro tunc, and whether Mrs. Gaskill had waived any 
right to alimony. (Record at 32). 
30. Mrs. Gaskill responded by asking the court to dismiss 
Mr. Gaskill's petition and moved for entry of judgment. (Record 
at 44-46, 47-52). 
31. The trial court granted judgment for Mrs. Gaskill in 
the amount of $81,239.36. (Record at 114). 
32. The record shows that Mrs. Gaskill has filed two 
memoranda in this case, but has not cited one statute, case or 
other authority in support of her position on the issues of 
waiver, estoppel and nunc pro tunc amendment of the decree, nor 
has she discussed these issues in light of the authorities cited 
by Mr. Gaskill. (Record at 47-52, 97-98). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Assuming without admitting that the decree contains a valid 
judgment to pay alimony, Mrs. Gaskill has waived her claim for 
alimony. Her waiver is based upon more than silence. She 
initiated an action to enforce the judgment in 1978, but 
thereafter did not respond to his affidavit in 1978, nor did she 
respond to the court's request to furnish memoranda, nor did she 
respond to the court's dismissal of her claim for failure to 
prosecute. Moreover, she did not thereafter, for "several 
years," (Mrs. Gaskill's affidavit, Record at 64, paragraph 8), 
initiate any affirmative claim, whether oral or written, for Mr. 
9 
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Gaskill to pay alimony, and has taken no further action to 
enforce her right to alimony since she allowed her action to 
enforce the judgment in 197 8 to be dismissed. 
Mr. Gaskill has relied to his detriment on Mrs. Gaskill's 
failure to act when she was under a duty or obligation to speak 
or act in response (1) to his defense in the 1978 action, (2) to 
the court's request for memorandum in the same case, or (3) to 
the court's dismissal of her action for failure to prosecute. 
Furthermore, he has relied on her subsequent failure to enforce 
the judgment for over twelve years. Therefore, Mrs. Gaskill 
should be estopped to assert her right to alimony. 
Moreover, the original decree including alimony provisions 
was entered based on a consent and waiver which was altered on 
its face to omit the consent to the terms of alimony set forth in 
the complaint. This circumstance created "good cause" to amend 
the decree nunc pro tunc pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l to 
delete the alimony provision. That there is good cause to amend 
the decree, is bolstered by Mrs. Gaskillfs subsequent failure to 
enforce the judgment for over twelve (12) years. 
Finally, the district court entered a judgment for an amount 
based on miscalculations resulting in a judgment substantially 
larger than the historical and mathematical facts support. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE LAW TO THE 
FACTS REGARDING MR. GASKILL'S CLAIMS THAT MRS. GASKILL 
WAIVED HER RIGHT TO ALIMONY AND/OR THAT SHE SHOULD BE 
ESTOPPED TO ASSERT THAT RIGHT. 
10 
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Because the undisputed facts support a finding of both 
waiver and estoppel against Mrs. Gaskill on the issue of alimony, 
the failure of the court to consider the elements of these 
defenses raised by Mr. Gaskill in light of the facts is 
reversible error. Marshalling the evidence in support of each 
party's position, the record shows the following: 
The facts, assuming the decree provides for a valid award of 
alimony, which show Mrs. Gaskill would be entitled to the 
judgment for alimony are: 
1. There is a decree of divorce which provides for the 
payment of alimony; (Record at 11). 
2. No payments have ever been made. 
3. All other facts are disputed and are based upon Mrs. 
Gaskill's affidavit which is vague and ambiguous. 
The undisputed facts which weigh in favor of Mr. Gaskill's 
position that Mrs. Gaskill waived her claim to alimony, and his 
alternative position that she should be estopped to assert her 
claim to alimony are as follows: 
1. The record does not show a response to Mr. Gaskill's 
"Affidavit in Support of Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce," 
filed in the 1978 action brought by Mrs. Gaskill for alimony 
arrearages. She did not act for seven months; 
2. Mrs. Gaskill failed to prosecute her action to enforce 
the judgment in 1978, even after being ordered by the court to 
11 
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submit a memorandum in support of her position; 
3. The record shows that Mrs. Gaskill did not seek any 
relief from the order dismissing her claim in the 1978 action; 
4. The record shows that Mrs. Gaskill did not take further 
legal action for more than twelve (12) years, from the July 2, 
1979f dismissal to the August 19, 1991, action for delinquent 
alimony in the State of Washington; 
5. For a period of "several years" the parties did not 
1
 Mr. Gaskill's failure to submit a memorandum and to 
prosecute to completion his defense in the 1978 action does not 
weigh in favor of the judgment for Mrs. Gaskillf because in the 
face of her failure to prosecute her action once his defense was 
raised, the most reasonable conclusion for Mr. Gaskill to draw 
was that she had determined not to pursue her cause of action, 
and had voluntarily waived any claim for alimony, based on her, 
or her counsel's, analysis of the relative strengths of the two 
positions. Mrs. Gaskill has not alleged that she abandoned the 
action for financial reasons, which might have been attributed to 
Mr. Gaskill's failure to pay alimony, and therefore might have 
made insignificant or irrelevant the fact of her failure to 
prosecute the action to completion. 
Nor does there appear on the record any other undisputed 
fact which might have led Mr. Gaskill to believe that she still 
maintained her claim for alimony. The only disputed fact is in 
paragraph 7 of her affidavit dated 8 February, 1992, which 
provides she asked him approximately six times to pay alimony. 
This bare statement does not state when, where, or who was 
present, or any specific facts which give the statement 
credibility. In fact, the next paragraph provides "several years 
passed without communication." The requests for alimony which 
Mrs. Gaskill alleges that she made subsequent to the dismissal of 
the 1978 action, (record at 64), if actually made, would not 
necessarily have lead Mr. Gaskill to believe that she had not 
waived her claim, but could reasonably have been interpreted as 
requests for help based on her own sense that he owed her 
something despite her conclusion that she had no legal claim. 
Finally, contrary to the conclusion of the commissioner, 
(record at 90), in the face of an apparent waiver of her claim, 
Mr. Gaskill may have perceived no practical incentive to incur 
further costs to prosecute his defense to an action that he 
believed had been waived, which belief was borne out by the 
subsequent twelve years of inaction by Mrs. Gaskill. 
12 
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communicate at all; (Mrs. Gaskill's affidavit dated 8 February, 
1992, paragraph 8, Record at 64). 
6. During the several occasions on which the parties 
associated at various gatherings, Mrs. Gaskill never once 
mentioned alimony or an intent to collect it to Mr. Gaskill; 
(Record at 27, paragraph 5, 73,74). 
7. Mrs. Gaskill knew that Mr. Gaskill was employed and 
believed that had the financial ability to pay alimony.2 
In addition to the foregoing undisputed facts, the evidence 
as to whether Mrs. Gaskill even once mentioned the issue of 
alimony or indicated any intent to seek to enforce it is 
disputed. With respect to seeking alimony payments from Mr. 
Gaskill, Mrs. Gaskill's affidavit states: 
a. That between the divorce in 1976 and the enforcement 
action in 1978, she "repeatedly asked Defendant to provide 
financial assistance to [herself] and pay the alimony as ordered 
by the Court," (record at 64); 
b. That "Defendant remarried in 1977 or 1978 and told me 
that his new wife would not allow him to pay alimony to me," 
(record at 64); 
c. That "After Defendant divorced his second wife, he 
contacted me approximately six times, and I again asked him to 
pay alimony to me and he refused," (record at 64); 
d. That Mr. Gaskill "told our children over the years that 
2
 Thus, her failure to claim alimony was not based on a 
belief that Mr. Gaskill was unable to pay. 
13 
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he was afraid to visit them in Utah because I would have him 
'thrown in jail' because he had not paid me any alimony," (record 
at 64) . 
Mrs. Gaskill's Affidavit is controverted by Mr. Gaskill's 
Affidavits in which he asserts that he has been informed of Mrs. 
Gaskill's claim for alimony only once, when he was served with 
the documents asserting her claim for $6,000 in alimony in 197 8. 
(Record at 27, 73). Moreover, Mrs. Gaskill's Affidavit is vague, 
ambiguous, lacks specificity, lacks foundation, is based in part 
on hearsay, and admits that for a period of "several years" she 
did not make demand upon Mr. Gaskill for alimony, and that they 
have associated several times over the years without any 
indication on her part, during such associations, that she 
intended to claim alimony. Although she claims that they did not 
discuss alimony because the children were present, she never 
claims to have asked for a private talk. (Record at 64, 65, 
paragraphs 10 and 11). 
A. 
Waiver Is A Legal Doctrine Which Can Be Based On Conduct Of 
The Party Against Whom It Is Asserted Which Is Inconsistent 
With Any Other Intent Than To Waive The Right. 
Waiver is a legal doctrine.3 This court has set out a three 
part test for waiver to occur: "'[1] there must be an existing 
right, benefit or advantage, [2] a knowledge of its existence, 
Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983). 
14 
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and [3] an intention to relinquish it.'"4 The elements of waiver 
do not include justifiable reliance or detrimental change of 
position by the party asserting the defense of waiver.5 Rather, 
the inquiry is focused on the party against whom the waiver is 
being asserted: did she have an existing right; did she know she 
had the right; did she intend to relinquish the right? 
In analyzing whether the person has exhibited an intention 
to relinquish the right, this court has said "'The party's 
actions or conduct must evince unequivocally an intent to waive, 
or must be inconsistent with any other intent.' 'Whether a right 
has been waived is generally a question of fact and therefore we 
accord considerable deference to the finder of fact's 
determination.'"6 
In the present case, the trial court made no determination 
as to the facts which would support a conclusion of waiver; 
therefore, no deference is necessary in evaluating the facts here 
because the facts which support a finding of waiver are 
undisputed as will be shown. Because all evidence was presented 
by affidavits, the court is in as good a position to view it and 
to apply it as was the trial court. 
4
 Hinkley v. Hinkley, 815 P.2d 1352 (Utah App. 1991) 
(quoting Mont Trucking v. Entrada Indus., 802 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah 
App. 1990) (quoting Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah 
App. 1988)). 
5
 As will be shown infra, however, justifiable reliance and 
detrimental change of position are elements of estoppel. See 
e.g., Hinkley, 669 P.2d at 432. 
6
 Id. 
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Mrs. Gaskill has notf by spoken or written word, expressed 
unequivocally an intent to waive her right to alimony. 
Thereforef her conduct must be evaluated to determine whether it 
is inconsistent with any other intent. 
B. 
Mrs. Gaskill's Conduct Is Inconsistent With Any Other Intent 
Than To Waive Her Right To Alimony. 
The case of Hinklev v. Hinklev, 815 P. 2d 1352 (Utah App. 
1991) is helpful. The parties were divorced in 1980. The decree 
ordered Mr. Hinkley to pay alimony in the amount of $1,200 a 
month, reduced by one-half of Mrs. Hinkley's net income. In 1989 
Mr. Hinkley filed a petition to reduce or terminate alimony. The 
trial court ruled that he waived his right to reduce his past 
alimony payment by one-half of her income for the years 1981 
through 1989. In affirming the trial court's ruling that he had 
waived his right to reduce past alimony the appellate court said: 
In order to find waiver in the present case, it must be 
shown that Mr. Hinkley had a right to the reduction, that 
he was awarded such right, and that he intentionally 
relinquished that right." Id. at 1354-55. 
In the Gaskill case, assuming the decree to contain a valid 
provision for alimony, Mrs. Gaskill had a right to receive 
alimony. She obviously knew of that right because she went to 
court to enforce it in 197 8. She was told to brief Mr. Gaskill's 
defenses in 197 8. She failed to act. She did not follow up on 
the dismissal of her claim. She claims, and this claim is 
disputed, that she asked him six times to pay alimony. (Record 
64 paragraph 7). Most significantly, she also provides in the 
16 
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next paragraph "several years passed without any communication 
between us." (Record 64 paragraph 8). 
It is known and undisputed that Mrs. Gaskill knew of Mr. 
Gaskill's defenses in 1978. She knew the action was dismissed in 
1979. It is undisputed she took no action from 1979 to 1991. 
Her failure to act after being confronted with his defenses for 
twelve years after her claim was dismissed in 1979 is 
"inconsistent with any other intent" other than to waive her 
claim for alimony. 
"The question whether waiver will be found in any particular 
case depends not upon the secret intention of the party 
against whom it is asserted, but upon the effect which her 
conduct had upon the other party."7 "Stated another way, one 
cannot prevent a waiver by a private mental reservation contrary 
to an intent to waive, where his or her actions clearly indicate 
such an intent."8 
On the other hand, it has also been recognized that, "Mere 
silence is not a waiver unless there is some duty or obligation 
to speak."9 Shedding further light on this principle, the Utah 
Supreme Court recently affirmed a jury instruction including the 
following provisions with regard to silence as a basis for 
7
 B.R. Woodward Mktq. v. Collins Food, 754 P.2d 99 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
8
 Id. 
9
 Plateau Min. v. Utah Div. of State Lands, 802 P.2d 720, 
730 (Utah 1990) ("The State's acceptance of royalty payments in 
amounts less than the amount owed does not mean that the State 
waived its right to full payment." Id.). 
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finding a waiver: 
A waiver may be shown from a totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the alleged waiver. 
* * * 
A waiver may be proved by indirect evidence. Silence, 
or failure to act under some circumstances may be sufficient 
to prove waiver where such silence or failure to act is 
unequivocal and inconsistent with any other intent. 
A waiver may be inferred from a party's acknowledgement 
of his rights and his subsequent course of conduct. You may 
look at the totality of the circumstancesf including the 
background experience and conduct of the party to determine 
if he made a voluntary waiver of a right.0 
Based upon the facts, Mrs. Gaskill cannot reasonably assert 
that the defense of waiver is based on "mere" silence. She once 
asserted her claim for alimony in an adversarial proceeding, and 
then, having failed to submit a memorandum supporting her 
position, abandoned her claim, allowed it to be dismissed, failed 
to seek relief from the dismissal, and failed to seek enforcement 
of the judgment for over twelve years. Contrary to the 
implication of the court that the question is a matter of who had 
the greater "incentive" to prosecute the action, the question is 
whether Mrs. Gaskill had "duty or obligation to speak," Plateau 
Min. v. Utah Div. of State Lands, 802 P.2d 720 at 730 (Utah 
1990). 
Generally, there is no duty or obligation to seek 
enforcement of a judgment. However, once Mrs. Gaskill brought an 
action to enforce the judgment, and was confronted with defenses 
she left her safe harbor. Her failure to supply the requested 
memorandum, or further prosecute the action, or seek relief from 
10
 Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069, 
1074 (Utah 1991). 
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the dismissal is clearly a failure to act in circumstances in 
which she had a "duty or obligation to speak or act."11 
Considering the "totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
alleged waiver,"12 Mrs. Gaskill's conduct is inconsistent with 
any other intent than to waive her right to alimony. 
In Hinkley, the court of appeals also affirmed the trial 
court's conclusion that the defendant had voluntarily waived his 
right to reduce his alimony payments for the entire nine year 
period between the divorce decree and the trial court's ruling, 
including those payments he had refused to make during the five 
months after attempting to assert his right to reduce his alimony 
payments by filing the petition. Id. at 1353. This conclusion 
demonstrates what has been expressly recognized in other 
jurisdictions, namely that once a right is waived, it cannot be 
asserted in a court of law thereafter.13 
11
 See e.g., Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20, 22 (Utah 1990)(the 
court stated, "Inasmuch as defendants brought the initial motion 
to dismiss, it was incumbent upon them to seek and obtain a final 
ruling on their motion from [the court]." 
12
 Rees, 808 P2d at 1074. 
13
 E.g., Vogel v. Carolina Int'l., Inc., 711 P.2d 708, 711 
(Colo. App. 1985) ("A waiver is a voluntary abandonment of a 
known right, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered 
and such persons be forever deprived of its benefit. [Citations 
omitted]."); Iola State Bank v. Biggs, 662 P.2d 563, 571-72 
(Kan. 1983) ("Once it has been established that a contractual 
right has been waived, a party possessing the contractual right 
is precluded from asserting it in a court of law. [Citations 
omitted].") 
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c. 
Estoppel Is An Equitable Doctrine Which May Be Based On A 
Person's Failure To Act When She Had A Duty Or Obligation To 
Act. 
Estoppel is an equitable doctrine.14 The Utah Supreme Court 
has defined the elements of estoppel as follows: "(i) [A] 
statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party 
inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable action 
or inaction by the other party taken or not taken on the basis of 
the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; 
and (iii) injury to the second party that would result from 
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such 
statement, admission, act, or failure to act. [Footnote 
omitted.]" Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20, 22 (Utah 1990). 
The focus of an equitable estoppel inquiry is on the party 
asserting it. Thus, it must be determined whether the person 
claiming an estoppel justifiably or reasonably relied on the act 
or failure to act of the other person. The question is not 
merely whether he subjectively relied on the act or failure to 
act, but whether his reliance was objectively reasonable.15 
Then, one must show "injury to the second party that would result 
from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such 
statement, admission, act, or failure to act," or, in other 
words, a detrimental change of position. 
In Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20 (Utah 1990), the plaintiff in 
a medical malpractice action filed a premature complaint, before 
14
 See e.g., Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 
1983). 
15
 Larson v. Wycoff Co., 624 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Utah 1981). 
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the prelitigation panel review was complete. Id. at 21. The 
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on the 
irregularity of the premature complaint. Id. The court did not 
dismiss the complaint, but instead tolled the proceedings until a 
prelitigation review could be completed. Id. The defendants 
failed to obtain a final ruling on their motion to dismiss. Id. 
at 22. The plaintiff did not file a second complaint within the 
sixty day period following completion of the panel's reviewf in 
which he was statutorily required to file his complaint, because 
his initial, premature complaint had not been dismissed. Id. 
The defendants' again moved to dismiss for failure to file within 
the statutory period. Id. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the 
trial court's dismissal, and held that, "Inasmuch as defendants 
brought the initial motion to dismiss, it was incumbent upon them 
to seek and obtain a final ruling on their motion from the court. 
Having failed to do so, defendants should now be estopped from 
asserting Mr. Avila's failure to file a second complaint." Id. 
at 22. The court found that the plaintiff's reliance, on the 
failure of the defendants to act to obtain a final ruling on 
their motion, was reasonable. 
D. 
Mrs. Gaskill's Failure To Act Is Sufficient To Support Mr. 
Gaskill's Assertion Of The Defense Of Estoppel. 
In the present case, Mrs. Gaskill likewise failed to 
prosecute her 1978 petition, and Mr. Gaskill relied to his 
detriment on her abandonment of her claim case by failing to 
pursue his defenses and by continuing his consistent conduct of 
21 
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not making alimony payments. He was entitled to believe that the 
alimony provision of the divorce decree was improperly entered 
contrary to the consent and waiverf as he had asserted in his 
defense. He was entitled to rely on her inaction. 
Specifically, Mrs. Gaskill failed to respond to Mr. 
Gaskillfs affidavit in support of motion to amend decree of 
divorce, failed to file a memorandum as requested by the court, 
failed to seek relief from the dismissalf failed to communicate 
at all with Mr. Gaskill for several yearsf failed to discuss 
alimony with him or even attempt to speak to him alone on any of 
the several occasions at which they associated over the past 
twelve years, and failed to bring an action to enforce the 
judgment for over twelve years after the first action which was 
dismissed. 
In Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788 P.2d 1046 (Utah App. 1990), this 
court statedf "it is uncontroverted that appellant failed to make 
any request or to take any action to require respondent to pay 
back child support for seven years. This was an unreasonable 
delay." Id. at 1048. This delay and Burrow's statement that she 
did not "wish to see him againf" Id. at 1047, was sufficient for 
an estoppel. 
By her own admission, Mrs. Gaskill made no communication 
with Mr. Gaskill for "several years", failed to mention alimony 
on any of the occasions when they did associate, and after the 
1978 action was dismissed, failed to bring any kind of action to 
enforce the judgment for over twelve years, almost twice the time 
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found to be unreasonable in Burrow, Moreover, she failed to act 
when she had a duty to act. She had a duty to act because it was 
incumbent upon her to seek and obtain a final resolution of her 
claim for unpaid alimony. See Avila, 794 P.2d 20 at page 22. 
It is clear that Mrs. Gaskill's failure to act was 
reasonably relied on to his detriment by Mr. Gaskill for over 
twelve years. Therefore, Mrs. Gaskill should be estopped to 
assert her right to alimony under the provisions of the decree of 
divorce. Failure to so find was reversible error. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT IT WOULD BE INEQUITABLE FOR 
MR. GASKILL TO ASSERT THE DEFENSES OF WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL. 
In addressing the issues of waiver and estoppel raised by 
each party, the commissioner wrote and the trial court adopted 
the following statement: 
Both parties claim the other should be estopped from 
asserting his or her position as a result of failure to 
resolve the actions initiated in October, 1978 and failure 
to pursue said positions at any point subsequent to 1978, 
and both parties assert that same circumstance result [sic] 
in the other's waiving any claim for relief. In not 
pursuing her claim for relief, plaintiff ran the risk that 
her recovery would be limited, as it has been, by operation 
of the applicable statute of limitations. Conversely, 
defendant's awareness of a prima facie valid order of the 
Court requiring his payment of alimony and his failure to 
prosecute his Motion to Amend said Decree created the risk 
that the order would be enforced against the defendant. Of 
the two, defendant had at least equal incentive to prosecute 
to completion the relief he sought in his 1978 pleading. 
Under the present circumstances, it would be inequitable to 
find that either party is estopped from asserting their 
respective positions or that they have waived the same. 
(Record at 90, 102). The trial court implies by this statement 
that Mrs. Gaskill's failure to prosecute the 1978 action to 
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completion or to bring another action in the subsequent twelve 
years only subjects her claim to the defense of the statute of 
limitations. Apparently because Mr. Gaskill failed in 197 8 to 
prosecute his defense to completion, the court concluded that Mr. 
Gaskill is therefore not entitled to assert the defense of 
waiver. However, there is no basis for this conclusion. The 
court cites no facts which would support an equitable bar to Mr. 
Gaskill's defenses of waiver and estoppel, but simply concludes 
that it would be inequitable to allow the defenses. 
A. 
There Are No Facts Which Support The Equitable Bar Of 
Estoppel Against Mr. Gaskill's Assertion Of The Defenses Of 
Waiver And Estoppel. 
Not only does the court fail to state a basis for concluding 
that equity precludes the assertion of the defenses of waiver and 
estoppel, there are no facts on the record which support such a 
conclusion. * 
There is no showing that Mrs. Gaskill has relied to her 
detriment on any act, or representation by Mr. Gaskill which 
would give rise to an equitable estoppel against either defense. 
Mr. Gaskill has never admitted that he owed alimony under the 
decree, but has maintained throughout that the order was 
improperly entered. It is significant that he never paid her, 
nor has Mr. Gaskill ever represented that he would not assert the 
defenses of waiver and estoppel. Although to one trained in the 
lawf it may seem illogical for Mr. Gaskill to have failed to 
fully prosecute a defense which may well have prevailed in the 
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1978 proceeding, to a layman it makes little sense to invest 
further monies in defense of an action which for all intents and 
purposes has been abandoned, presumably in recognition of the 
strength of his proffered defense, Mr. Gaskill's failure to 
prosecute his defense in these circumstances cannot be considered 
grounds for reasonable reliance on a conclusion that he had 
abandoned the defense, or that he had waived that defense or any 
other defenses in the matter. There are no facts on which to 
base a conclusion that Mr. Gaskill should be equitably estopped 
from asserting the defenses of waiver and estoppel. 
B. 
There Are No Facts Which Support The Equitable Bar Of Laches 
Against Mr. Gaskill's Assertion Of The Defenses Of Waiver 
And Estoppel. 
If the court had in mind the bar of laches, it likewise 
failed to point to any facts which would support such a 
conclusion, and there are no such facts in the record. Laches is 
applicable when a delay due to lack of diligence by one party 
causes a disadvantage to the other party.16 Any lack of 
diligence on the part of Mr. Gaskill in pursuing his defense in 
1978 was prompted by the lack of diligence of Mrs. Gaskill in 
prosecuting her complaint against him, and cannot reasonably be 
construed as causing an injury or disadvantage to her. 
Specifically, it would not be reasonable to assume that he had 
conceded her position because he did not fully prosecute his 
16
 Plateau Min. v. Utah Div. of State Lands, 802 P.2d 720, 
731 (Utah 1990). 
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defense in 1978. Mrs. Gaskill has not changed her position due 
to Mr. Gaskill's failure to seek relief from the judgment. When 
he raised his defenses in 1978, she failed to prosecute the 
action further, and despite his subsequent failure to prosecute 
his defenses in that action, Mrs. Gaskill has not changed her 
position from her initial abandonment of the claim for over 
twelve years. Mr. Gaskill's defenses of waiver and estoppel do 
not change the status quo which Mrs. Gaskill has allowed to exist 
not only for the previous twelve years, but also for the two 
years prior to the 1978 action. 
The court, in the above-quoted paragraph, also concluded 
that, "Of the two, defendant [Mr. Gaskill] had at least equal 
incentive to prosecute to completion the relief he sought in his 
1978 pleading." While the accuracy of this conclusion is 
questionable, it is irrelevant in either case. Mr. Gaskill may 
or may not have had incentive to prosecute his defense to 
completion in 1978, but that fact has nothing to do with whether 
Mrs. Gaskill had a right, knew of that right, and intentionally 
relinquished it, or whether Mr. Gaskill reasonably relied to his 
detriment on the conduct and failure to act of Mrs. Gaskill. If 
the facts show that Mr. Gaskill is entitled to the defenses of 
waiver and estoppel today, the fact that he failed to prosecute 
his Rule 60(b)(7) defense to completion in 1978, taken in light 
of all of the circumstances, is not sufficient to support an 
equitable bar to his assertion of waiver and estoppel. 
Therefore, the court's conclusion that it would be inequitable to 
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allow Mr. Gaskill to assert his defenses of waiver and estoppel, 
is error. 
POINT III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF AN ORDER MODIFYING THE DECREE 
NUNC PRO TUNC IS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
The district court affirmed the commissioner's 
recommendation, which states: 
"Defendant seeks, in the alternative, an order modifying the 
Decree of Divorce terminating defendant's obligation to pay 
alimony to plaintiff. In this regard defendant has failed 
to allege, and the Court cannot find, a substantial change 
of circumstances has occurred material to the issue of 
alimony. Consequently the Court recommends the Decree of 
Divorce not be modified."17 
A. 
The Court Applied the Wrong Law in Ruling on the Motion for 
an Order Modifying the Original Decree Nunc Pro Tunc. 
The test applied by the trial court, and affirmed by the 
district court, in ruling on Mr. Gaskill's motion to amend the 
decree nunc pro tunc is the test set forth in Hinkley v. Hinkley, 
815 P.2d 1352 (Utah App. 1991), wherein it is stated, "'To obtain 
a modification of a divorce decree, the movant must show a 
substantial change of circumstances subsequent to the decree, 
that was not contemplated within the decree itself.' [Citations 
omitted]." Id. at 1354 (emphasis in original). 
Mr. Gaskill did not, however, seek a subsequent modification 
to the divorce decree. (Record 32, 34, 36). Rather, he is 
seeking to amend the original decree nunc pro tunc. The rule of 
law to be applied in determining whether to grant a nunc pro tunc 
17
 Record at 92. 
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amendment of a divorce decree is set out by statute in Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-4a-l (1990), and differs substantially from the rule 
applied by the district court. Section 30-4a-l provides, "A 
court having jurisdiction may, upon its finding of good cause and 
giving of such notice as may be ordered, enter an order nunc pro 
tunc in a matter relating to marriage, divorce, legal separation 
or annulment of marriage." 
At common law the nunc pro tunc power of the court was used 
for two general purposes, the one being to correct a clerical or 
ministerial error of the court, the other being to remedy a 
situation in which a party died between the time the case was 
submitted and the time judgment was to be rendered in the case. 
Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 299 (Utah 1984). The use of the 
common law nunc pro tunc power to correct a clerical error is 
only permitted to make the record reflect what actually happened; 
it is not used to retrospectively enter an order based on 
hindsight as to what the court ought to have done. Id. 
Such was the state of the law regarding nunc pro tunc orders 
in Utah until the above referenced statute, Utah Code Ann. § 30-
4a-1, was enacted which modifies the common law doctrine by 
"committing broad discretion to trial courts in granting nunc pro 
tunc orders in domestic matters," Home v. Home, 737 P.2d 244, 
247 (Utah App. 1987) (emphasis in original). In Home the court 
stated that, "A literal reading of § 30-4a-l indicates a 
legislative intent to change the standard for entry of nunc pro 
tunc orders in domestic proceedings from requiring a previously 
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made final order as delineated by common law, to requiring a 
finding of "good cause." Id. at 248 (emphasis in original). 
Thus, because this case deals with matters relating to 
divorce, it falls within the scope of § 30-4a-l. Mr. Gaskill is 
entitled to an order modifying the decree nunc pro tunc if two 
conditions are met, namely a finding of good cause and the giving 
of such notice as may be ordered. 
B. 
Mr. Gaskill Is Entitled To An Order Modifying The Decree Of 
Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc Because The Undisputed Facts Establish 
Good Cause For Such An Order. 
In defining "good cause," the court in Home stated that, 
"it must be borne in mind that the legislative history indicates 
an intention to give the courts wide discretion to prevent 
'obvious injustices.' The meaning of 'good cause' must be 
determined on a case by case basis, in light of all of the 
surrounding circumstances, as equity and justice require. 
[Citations omitted]."18 "The Utah Supreme Court has frequently 
stated that in construing legislative enactments, courts must 
give effect to the legislature's underlying intent."19 
In Baqshaw v. Baqshaw, 788 P.2d 1057 (Utah App. 1990), this 
court stated that certain of the common law principles concerning 
nunc pro tunc "are relevant, if not controlling, in a 
determination of good cause under Section 30-4a-l." Id. at 1061. 
Relevant to the present case, the court in Baqshaw pointed out 
18
 IcL_ at 248-49. 
19
 IdU. at 247. 
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that at common law, "nunc pro tunc allowed a court to correct its 
earlier error or supply its. amission so the record accurately 
reflected that which in fact had taken place," Id, at 1060. The 
provision providing alimony in the original decree was the 
court's error. Mr. Gaskill did not consent to it. Mr. Gaskill 
should not be penalized for failure to pursue relief from the 
error of the court. 
In light of the foregoing principles, good cause exists for 
allowing an order nunc pro tunc to omit the alimony provisions 
from the decree. The facts which clearly so indicate are as 
clear to this court as to the district court. First, the consent 
and waiver does not state that Mr. Gaskill has, or knows that he 
should have, consulted with legal counsel before signing the 
waiver and consent form. There is no evidence of any attempt to 
advise defendant to seek legal counsel before or after he signed 
the consent and waiver. Second, Mr. Gaskill altered the consent 
and waiver to omit consent to entry of a default judgment on the 
terms in the complaint. Mr. Gaskill's attempt to consent to 
waiver of personal service while objecting to entry of a default 
judgment for alimony by writing "omit #8 on complaint" on the 
waiver was probably done without the direction of counsel, 
because it is unlikely that an attorney familiar with the rules 
of procedure would proceed in such a manner. Third, the obvious 
lack of legal counsel and the obvious attempt to object to entry 
of a default judgment for alimony, clear in substance though 
improper in form, ought to have raised a red flag for the court 
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and for plaintiff that there was not an agreement to the terms 
for alimony set forth in the complaint. Furthermore, such a 
procedural mistake by defendant was potentially grounds for 
subsequent relief from the judgment pursuant to Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b).20 
In Locke v. Peterson, 285 P.2d 1111, 1113, (Utah 1955), when 
the copy of the summons left with the defendant differed from the 
copy of the summons filed with the court, and was defective and 
could not have conferred jurisdiction on the court itself, the 
court stated: 
Thus we have filed a proper summons, receipt of which is 
accepted which conferred jurisdiction of the defendant on 
the court. However if a true copy of the summons which was 
left with the defendant had been filed it would have been 
defective and would not have conferred jurisdiction. This 
situation created sufficient confusion that the motion to 
set aside the default and judgment against the defendant 
should have been granted and he should have been allowed to 
plead consistent with our declared policy that in case of 
uncertainty, default judgments should be set aside to allow 
trial on the merits. [Emphasis added.] 
The fact in Locke on which the court based its conclusion that 
the service of process created "sufficient uncertainty" that the 
20
 In Nev v. Harrison, 299 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1956), the court 
held that there were sufficient grounds for the trial court, in 
its discretion, to grant relief from the judgment pursuant to 
Rule 60(b)(7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, where the 
defaulting defendant had mistakenly believed she was fully 
protected in the matter by a divorce decree ordering her husband 
to pay any real estate commissions arising from the sale of 
apartments, which commissions were the subject of the suit. The 
court distinguished the case from Weinberger v. Manning, 123 P.2d 
531 (Cal. App. 1942), in which the defaulted party had "refused 
to hire counsel although she had been [repeatedly] advised to do 
so and had general experience with lawyers," and her "entire 
conduct showed contemptuous disregard of legal process." Ney, 
299 P.2d at 1116-17, n.5. 
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defendant's motion to set aside should have been granted is 
simply that the copy of the summons left with the defendant did 
not advise him whether a complaint had already been filed or 
whether one would be filed within ten days. 
The question of the effect Mr. Gaskill's alteration of the 
consent and waiver may be a question of first impression. As 
evidenced by the course of proceedings in this case, however, the 
alteration by Mr. Gaskill did in fact create sufficient 
uncertainty to entitle him to relief pursuant to a timely Rule 
60(b)(7) motion under present case law. 
But, more than thatf it must be recognized that Mr. 
Gaskill's notation on the "consent and waiver" form to "omit #8 
on Complaint" is no more an unconditional manifestation of 
consent and waiver of personal service and opportunity to be 
heard on the issue of alimony than a counter-offer is an 
unconditional manifestation of acceptance in the formulation of a 
contract. At bestf the consent and waiver was sufficient 
publication to confer jurisdiction on the court to enter a decree 
of divorce without alimony, pursuant to Section 30-3-1, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 as amended. 
If the court intended to proceed on the issue of alimony, 
then it was incumbent upon the trial court to require that an 
opportunity to be heard be given Mr. Gaskill. Otherwise, the 
court should have ordered the alimony terms stricken because that 
term was omitted on the consent. In any case, the court was or 
should have been on notice that there was an irregularity in the 
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acceptance of service and that the defendant was not a consenting 
party to an uncontested award of alimony. 
If however, the consent was fatally defective, then arguably 
the court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant, 
and the judgment does not bind him. This is an undesirable and 
unnecessary result because of subsequent marriages. 
If the better reasoning is followed, that the consent and 
waiver was sufficient "publication" to confer jurisdiction on the 
court to enter a decree of divorce without terms of alimony, then 
the conclusion must be that, since the court did not provide or 
require notice and opportunity to be heard on the issue of 
alimony, those provisions were improperly entered and there is 
good cause to have them deleted a nunc pro tunc. The advantage 
of this alternative is that the divorce decree can, in large 
measure, be left as it is. The alimony provisions of the decree, 
however, having been entered by default in the face of an 
apparent objection on the record, clear in substance if not 
proper in form, and without further notice to the defendant, or 
opportunity to be heard, should not stand. The decree should be 
amended nunc pro tunc to delete the alimony provisions. Failure 
to enter said order was reversible error. 
POINT IV. 
IF MRS. GASKILL IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT, THE TRIAL COURT 
SHOULD BE REVERSED AND THE MATTER REMANDED FOR A 
DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE AMOUNT. 
The court entered a judgment in the amount of $81,239.36. 
The statute of limitations limxts the recovery of Mrs. Gaskill to 
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the eight years. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-22. The judgment is for 
96 months of delinquent alimony. The amount of the alimony award 
is $450.00 per month. Interest on the amounts due is calculated 
at 10%, based upon Section 15-1-1 of the Utah Code. If judgment 
should be entered, it should be computed as $450 a month with 
interest at 10% when each payment is due. That amount is 
$60,660. (See Appendix B). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, appellant Don R. Gaskill, 
respectfully requests this court to reverse the district court 
and direct that court to enter an order that Mrs. Gaskill has 
waived her right to alimony or that she is estopped to assert 
that right. In the alternative, Mr. Gaskill requests this court 
to reverse the district court and direct that court to enter an 
order amending the decree nunc pro tunc to omit the provision for 
alimony. Finally, if this court determines that Mrs. Gaskill is 
entitled to a judgment for alimony, Mr. Gaskill requests this 
court to vacate the judgment as to the amount of the judgment and 
order the district court to enter an award for the proper amount. 
L Dated this ^ day of January, 1993. 
BRENT D. YOUNi 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this [& day of January, 1993, I 
caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant Don R. Gaskill, to Helen E. Christian, 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee, postage prepaid, addressed as 
follows: 
Helen E. Christian 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
Suite 722 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL aka LEE 
o C < m ! f N T W - APPELLEE 
VS. 
DON R. GASKILL 
DEFENDANT - APPELLANT 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
DISTRICT COURT NO. 764923691 
COURT OF APPEALS NO. 920632-CA 
I, clerk of the above entitled court, do hereby certify that 
the hereto attached file contains all the original papers as 
requested by the designation on file herein, filed in the court in 
the above entitled case, including the Notice of Appeal which was 
filed on the 25th day of September 1992. I further certify 
that tne above described documents constitute the Judgment Roll and 
that the same is a true and correct transcript of the record as it 
appears in my office. 
I further certify that said Judgment Roll is this date 
transmitted to the Appellate Court of the State of Utah, pursuant 
to such appeal. 
Witness my hand and the seal of said court at Salt Lake City, 
Utah, this 23 day of October 19 92. 
CRAIG E. LUDWIG 
CLERK OF 
A. 
BY 
THE COURT/ \ 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN & FOR SALT LAKE COUNT 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL 
a/k/a LEE AND LEA GASKILL 
, P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . C O M P L A I N T 
DON R. GASKILL, C i v i l No, D 2 3 6 9 1 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW the plaintiff and for cause of action alleges 
as follows: 
1. Plaintiff and defendant were married on the 6th day 
of May, 1951 in Golden, Colorado and have as issue of the 
marriage four children, all of whom have reached their majority 
by age or by marriage. 
2. That the plaintiff and defendant are residents of 
Salt Lake County and have been residents of the State of Utah 
for in excess of eight years prior to the date hereof. 
3. That plaintiff and defendant are no longer compatible! 
or shar mutual love or affection. 
4. That the defendant has absented himself from the 
family home for a period in excess of eight months. 
5. That the defendant is gainfully employed, earning 
approximately $1,500 per month as a construction supervisor and 
the plaintiff is presently engaged in the School of Cosmotology 
in which she anticipates graduating in approximately 30 months. 
6. That the plaintiff and defendant have made a 
physical division of all property belonging to each other with 
the defendant receiving as his sole and exclusive property his 
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personal effects and a truck, with the plaintiff retaining the 
family furniture, a 1971 Toranado automobile. 
7. That the plaintiff and defendant are in the process 
of resolving debts and claims arising out of the construction, 
fire, sheriff's sale and subsequent sale of redemption on 
property located in North Layton, and upon the payment of out-
standing bills arising therefrom plaintiff, by agreement of 
plaintiff and defendant, is to retain the proceeds as her sole 
and exclusive property, 
8. That the defendant pay the plaintiff $700.00 per 
month alimony for a period of 30 months, after which time the 
defendant has agreed to pay the plaintiff $450.00 per month 
for the remainder of her life, providing, however, that should 
the plaintiff re-marry all alimony payments shall cease forthwith, 
9. That the plaintiff desires to retain her married 
name of Lea Alberta F. Gaskill. 
10. That the plaintiff and defendant have agreed that 
attorney's fees shall be a claim and satisfied with the 
outstanding debts arising out of the family interest in the 
real property as set forth above and to be paid at the time 
that the funds are received in conjunction therewith. 
11. That the plaintiff and defendant have'been physic-
ally separated for a period in excess of eight months and prior 
to that time for an additional period of six months prior to 
a temporary reconciliation during which time both parties have 
made plans which would greatly be facilitated by a waiver of 
interlocutory periods as required by the statute. 
WHEREFORE the plaintiff prays judgment in the dissolution 
of the marriage, retention of her married name, the ratification 
of the division and disposition of property as per the agree-
ment hereinbefore set forth, and by attorney's fees to be levied 
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as claimed against the family asset flowing from the proceeds 
of the home. 
DATED this J^J day of S/+J&- 1976. 
LEE A. GASKILL 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, LEE A. GASKILL, the plaintiff named in the foregoing 
Complaint, do hereby make solemn oath that the statements 
contained therein are true to the best of my knowledge, 
information and belief. . J 
LEE A. GASKILLN ^ L 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thisJ^T day of 
'W • • • , 1976. 
Notary Public 
Residing at j , ^ 
My commission empire's:" &/7X 
7 RUNYAN \7* 
'Attorney for Plaintiff 
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SALT I A! TAJ-
JOHN E. RUNYAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4625 South 2300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: 278-0431 
SFP 15 8 n AH 76 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL 
a/k/a LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
MOTION 
FOR 
WAIVER OF THE INTERLOCUTORY 
PERIOD 
Civil No. PJ3&1/ 
COME NOW the plaintiff and defendant and by their 
signatures attached hereto hereby petition the court for a 
waiver of the interlocutory periods both prior to and following 
the entry of the Decree inasmuch as the parties hereto have 
made extensive attempts for reconciliation which have failed, 
have been separated in excess of eight months during which 
time both parties have made commitments and plans requiring 
the parties absence from the state, which plans will be greatly 
facilitated by the waiver petitioned for herein. 
DATED this /^./ day ot^L^^j/ , 1976. 
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JOHN E. RUNYAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4625 South 2300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: 2 78=0 4 31 
SPP/5 "8IIJW7G 
CPUTr CLEAK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERTA FAT ^Y GASKILL 
a/k/a LEE < LEA GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
CONSENT AND WAIVER 
civil NO. y-f3t>f/ 
Defendant. 
) ss. 
) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
DON R. GASKILL, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says: That he is the defendant in the above-entitled action; 
that he acknowledges the receipt of a copy of the Complaint 
in the foregoing action, enters his appearance and consent 
herein, waives service of Summons upon him, waives time 
within which to answer or otherwise plead this said Complaint 
and consents that his default may be entered and that the 
Court may proceed to hear and determine said cause at any 
time and without notice to said d^JtejfctJSFit. 
DON R. 
SUBSCRIBED ,-JtfD SWORN to before me this 
, 197.;. 
c/C day of 
12S )TARY PUBLIC Residing a t ^ / C C # + K < J foj 
My commission e x p i r e s : JP-/-79 
MMM^WWM^ * * " ***m OFFICIAL SEAL 
?'•-, BARBARA J . HULSE 
NOTARY PUBLIC • CALIFORNIA 
PRINCIPAL OFFICE IN 
LOS ANGELLS COUNTY 
My Commission Expires August 1, 1979 
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\
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE - STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERTA FANNEY G A S K I L L , a k a . 
Plaintiff 
LEE and LEA GASKILL 
MINUTE ORDER 
cas»« P-23691 
DON R. GASKILL 
Type of hearing: Div_ 
XXX 
Present: Pltf_ XXX .Deft. 
. Annul-
P At»y JOHN E . RUNY 
P Afty 
Sworn & Examined: 
Pltf XXX 
AN 
-Def t 
-OSC -Other-
Summons 
\A/aiui»r A A A 
Default: 
Date: 
Judge:. 
.Stipulation. 
.Publication. 
Pltf-
DECEMBER *, . w , 
JAMES S. SAWAYA if; 
XXX 
T37F 
r.»afw. RUSSELL TANNER 
q»pn,f,. J E A N I E WRIGHT 
Bailiff: POINT G I L E S 
ORDERS: 
Counseling ordered 
Custody study ordered. 
Custody awarded to 
Visitation rights . Reasonable, or:. 
Support $ X . .per month Alimony $ 
Payments to be made thru the clerks office 
each month, or Ya by the and % by the-
Atty fees to the in the amount of $ 
Home to Pltf Deft Use of 
Per month/year 
Payments to be made by the of 
of each month 
, or Deferred 
Furnishings to Pltf Deft Use of_ 
Auto to Pltf Deft_ 
.to pay debts incurred prior to 
.to pay court costs of $ within . 
.days 
n iwn^^fHtn PLAINTIFF, . PRAYED except P l a i n t i f f 1s awarded 
$4bU,U0 per month a l imony . Decree 
s h a l l not become f i n a l u n t i l th ree 
months after entry. 
-..counsel, the court orders: 
Based on stipulation of cousel or on motion of 
-of . 
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W.ST£Hljh>EVANSja.ERK ^ r 
BY J & * £ ^ ^ 
DEPUTY CLERK 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL 
a/k/a LEE or LEA GASKILL, CIVIL NO. D-23691 
Plaintiff, FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
vs. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
This matter came regularly before the Court on the 
17th day of December, 19 76 at the hour of 11:00 p.m. before 
the Honorable 
there being attendant the plaintiff,-Alberta Fanney Gaskill, 
a/k/a Lee or Lea Gaskill, and her attorney, John E. Runyan, 
the plaintiff having filed an Appearance and Waiver authorizing 
the entry of the Default as per the provisions in the Complaint; 
the same was taken note of by the Court and the default entered. 
Upon testimony given, the plaintiff established that: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That plaintiff and defendant are no longer com-
patible or share mutual love or affection. 
2. That the defendant has absented himself from the 
family home for a period in excess of eight months. 
3. That the defendant is gainfully employed, earning 
approximately $1,500 per month as a construction supervisor and 
the plaintiff is presently engaged in the School of Cosmotology 
in which she anticipates graduating in approximately 30 months. 
4. That the plaintiff and defendant have made a 
physical division of all property belonging to each other with 
the defendant receiving as his sole and exclusive property his 
000008 
JOHN E. RUNYAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1441 East 21st South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: 486-0067 
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personal effects and a truck, with the plaintiff retaining 
the family furniture and a 1971 Toronado automobile. 
5. That the plaintiff and defendant are in the process 
of resolving debts and claims arising out of the construction, 
fire, sheriff's sale and subsequent sale of redemption on 
property located in North Layton, and upon the payment of out-
standing bills arising therefrom plaintiff, by agreement of 
plaintiff and defendant, is to retain the proceeds as her sole 
and exclusive property. 
6. That the defendant pay the plaintiff $450.00 per 
month for the remainder of her life, providing, however, that 
should the plaintiff re-marry all alimony payments shall cease 
forthwith. 
7. That the plaintiff desires to retain her married 
name of Lea Alberta F. Gaskill. 
8. That the plaintiff and defendant have agreed that 
attorney's fees shall be a claim^and satisfied with the 
outstanding debts arising out of the family interest in the 
real property as set forth above and to be paid at the time 
that the funds are received in conjunction therewith. 
9. That the plaintiff and defendant have been physically 
separated for a period in excess of eight months and prior 
to that time for an additional period of six months prior 
to a temporary reconcilliation during which time both 
parties have made plans which would greatly be facilitated 
by a waiver of interlocutory periods as required by the 
statute. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
From the foregoing facts, the Court determined as 
Conclusions of Law that the plaintiff is entitled to the 
dissolution of the marriage as prayed in the Complaint, 
that the plaintiff shall retain her married name of Alberta 
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Fanney Gaskill, aka Lee or Lea Gaskill, and shall receive 
the property presently held as her sole and exclusive 
property. 
That the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment for 
alimony in the amount of $450.00 per month for the remainder 
of her life, providing, however, that if the plaintiff 
should remarry, all alimony payments shall cease forthwith. 
That the attorney's fees incident hereto shall be drawn 
from funds due plaintiff and defendant out of real property 
as interest formerly held 
DATED this %0 day 
Oeputy Clerk 
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• ^ 11 M W i*r» 
JOHN E. RUNYAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff \• 
1441 East 21st South >\ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Telephone: 486-0067 
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?RICT CC IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIST I OURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL 
a/k/a. LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
CIVIL NO, D-23691 
Upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed 
herein, the following judgment is hereby entered: 
1. That the marriage between the plaintiff and defendant 
shall be dissolved and become effective upon the expiration 
of 90 days from the date hereof, 
2. That the plaintiff shall retain her married name of 
Alberta Fanney Gaskill, a/k/a Lee or Lea Gaskill. 
3. That the plaintiff and defendant shall retain 
property as divided as among them. 
4. That the plaintiff shall receive alimony in the 
amount of $450.00 per month for the remainder of her life, 
providing, however, that if the plaintiff should remarry, all 
alimony payments shall cease forthwith. 
5. That attorney's fees shall be paid from proceeds 
of the sale of real property formerly held by
 Nt}iek plaintiff 
and defendant. 
DATED this -WCTi day 
ATTEST 
W. STERLING EVANS 
}iER 
SAWS* 
Judge of the District Court 
Deputy Clerk ^<««»*'V. 
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READ R, HELLEWELL of 
STRINGHAM, LARSEN, MAZURAN & SABIN 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
200 North Main Street,, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-1501 
APR 1^  4 3i!V78^ 
^ 4 ^ i . . . : . - L. / / 
^ T CfcVUfY CLERK U 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL 
a/k/a LEE or LEA GASKILL 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Civil No. »5»a 
p -2301 I 
ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Plaintiff, Alberta Fanney Gaskill a/k/a Lee or Lea 
Gaskill,being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. That she is the Plaintiff in the above-named action 
and is a resident of Salt Lake County. 
2. That on the 30th day of December, 1976, a Decree of 
Divorce was entered by the Honorable James S. Sawaya, one of the 
Judges of the above-entitled Court, divorcing Plaintiff and 
Defendant. 
3. That under the terms of said Decree, Defendant was 
ordered to pay to Plaintiff alimony in the amount of Four Hundred 
Fifty Dollars ($450.00) per month for the remainder of her life, 
providing, however, that if the Plaintiff should remarry, all 
alimony payments shall cease forthwith, 
4. That she is unmarried and is, therefore, entitled to 
receive the aforesaid alimony payments. 
5. That during the months of January, February, April, 
June, August, September, October, November, and December 1977, 
nnnm2 
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and also January, February, and March 1978, Defendant has failed 
to make any alimony payments in the amount provided under the 
above-mentioned Decree and that during the months of March, May, 
and July 1977 Defendant has fa.iled to make full alimony payments 
in the amount provided under the above-mentioned Decree and is 
presently in arrears in said payments in the sum of Six Thousand 
Dollars ($6,000,00), 
6, That Defendant's failure to pay said payments in 
the required amounts has imposed an economic hardship on Plaintiff, 
7. That the emotional conflict between the parties is 
such that Plaintiff's emotional well being would be enhanced if 
Defendant's payments were to be made directly to the Family 
Support Division of the Salt Lake County Clerk's Office, 
DATED this 'G day of April, 1978. 
JLOL & ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, 
a/k/a LEE or LEA GASKILL 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this G ~~ day of 
April, 1978. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing In 
My Commission Expires: 
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CD Iffl IW C n '-• " " D IN CLERICS OFRCE 
Q C%' •  9 Js ^ '78 ' **Ul* Coun*y'Ufah 
S^ C ( J READ R. HELLEWKLL ' ^ f ^ ' F ^ s W * ! flPT tf 1Q7ft 
£ Attorney for Plaintiff
 | f Wf t f . c l fS^ UL' • "9/tf 661 East 400 South ' ••' 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0754 "* w Deputy CUrk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DI$TVRJCT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH> 
ALHERTA FANNKY GASKILL 
a/U/a LEE or LfcA GASKILL 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DON R. GASKILL 
Defendant. 
) i 
) MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Civil No. D 23691 
D' 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter and moves 
the Court for an Order requiring the Defendant to appear and to show 
cause, if any he has, why Defendant should not be held in contempt of 
Court for failing to pay alimony payments as he was ordered to do by the 
terms of the Decree of Divorce entered on the 30th day of December, 1976; 
why Judgment should not be entered against Defendant in the amount of 
Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00); why all future payments should not be 
made directly to the Family Support Division of the Salt Lake County Clerk; 
and why Defendant should not pay Plaintiff's costs incurred herein, including 
a reasonable attorney's fee. 
This Motion is based on the pleadings and Plaintiff's Affidavit 
which are on file herein. 
DATED this day of September, 1978. 
^Hi 
READ R. HELLEWELL 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
nnnm A 
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O R D E R 
Having read the foregoing Motion and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Defendant, Don R. Gaskill, personally 
appear before the Honorable Peter F. Leary, one of the Judges of the above-
entitled Court at the Courts Building, 240 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, on Wednesday, the 11th day of October, 1978, at 10 a.m. and then and 
there to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of Court; why all 
future payments should not be made directly to Family Support Division of 
the Salt Lake County Clerk; why hevshould not have Judgment entered against 
him in the amount of Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00); and why he should not 
pay Plaintiff's costs incurred herein, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
DATED this Q day of September, 1978. 
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Before me the undersigned authority, on this 
day did personally appear C V , ^ v ^ \kc^oXt > 
who being first duly sworn did depose and say 
-as follows: 
She is a Deputy Constable of the County of 
Harris, State of Texas and that he has executed 
service of the citation in the cause numbered 
(LlufTio. & b j * *?./ and e n t i t l e d ^ D»„RG*~hLu on the 
5 day of jQ^cdCisvwJbtsi 19 7& at_ 
by delivering to D,<^ id B<u^>&JU a copy of the 
above numbered and entitled cause. 
Dep u t y / . 
- ^ v ^ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, 
this _ / £ _ ^y of ,JjJj~ , 1 9 ^ 
y \ 
NOTARY PUBLIC frf and f o r 
H a r r i s C o d n t y , T e x a s , , . 
My commission e x p i r e s 3 - 3 A # 4 
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1 FILMED] 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE - STATE OF UTAH 
;-?'/• • G'/',,/,// 
Plaintiff 
AtA'A' MINUTE ORDER 
Case* {Q-JZtilf 
Type of hearing. Div- - Annul-
Pltf-Present: 
P. Arty /d I / *</*> y'/><^-s/^ 
D. Atty ,M r' • S /$< W £ / £ ^ 
_Deft—Ct/'/i) 
Sworn & Examined: 
Pltf 
Others _ 
.Deft. 
- O S C - -Other-
Summons. 
Waiver 
-Stipulation-
-Publication-
Default: Pltf. 
Date: SO ~//~ ? fr 
Deft-
Judge -sjf&c/ki^ *?Zf<&Ly 
Clerk: Q g A* i^ar^ _ 
"TT Reporter: ?r'fl<rdp d>y 
Bailiff: Jfajfa' 
ORDERS: 
Counseling ordered 
Custody study ordered. 
Custody awarded to 
Visitation rights .Reasonable, or:_ 
Support. =$_ -per month Alimony $ 
Payments to be made thru the clerks office 
each month, or V* by the and % by the-
Atty tees to the in the amount of $ 
Home to Pltf Deft Use of 
Furnishings to Pltf Deft Use of 
Auto to Pltf Deft 
Per month/year 
Payments to be made by the of 
of each month 
, or Deferred 
.to pay debts incurred prior to 
.to pay court costs of $ within days 
Divorce granted to-
-as_ 
Based on tttpolaftorrofnsecftetWF on motion of 
/ 
.counsel, the court orders: x £ J O /^*lf^ o/s/e~ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 
SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, I 
aka LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
I 
Plaintiff, 
X 
vs. NO. D-23691 
X 
DON R. GASKILL, 
I 
Defendant. 
X 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO AMEND DECREE OF DIVORCE 
STATE OF UTAH X 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE X 
Comes now DON R. GASKILL and petitions the Court, as 
follows: 
1. That he is the defendant above named. 
2. That on or about the 18th of September 1976, while 
a resident of the State of California, the said DON R. GASKILL 
received by mail a proposed consent and waiver in connection 
with the foregoing divorce matter. That in addition to receiving 
the consent and waiver the said DON R. GASKILL received a copy 
of the complaint of the plaintiff, which complaint, in paragraph 
8 thereof, provided that the defendant pay to the plaintiff ali-
mony in the sum of $700 per month for 30 months, and $450 per 
month thereafter for life. 
3. That your affiant executed the consent and waiver forwarded 
to him, but in said consent and waiver wrote in the words"omit para. 8 
n n f t A l f t 
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on complaint." For reference, defendant attaches hereto copy of 
said consent and waiver, as filed with the court, 
4. That it was the intent of your affiant, Don R. Gaskill, 
that the decree of divorce entered in the above entitled matter be 
entered upon the basis that no alimony be awarded to the plaintiff, 
and for this reason the notation, as aforesaid, was entered upon the 
consent and waiver. 
5. That apparently the court, notwithstanding the intent 
to omit the alimony requested by plaintiff's complaint, entered an 
order awarding to plaintiff the sum of $450 per month as alimony, 
the same being against the wishes, will and consent of the defen-
dant, Don R. Gaskill. 
6. That by reason of the fact that the court failed to • 
acknowledge the provision of the defendant, Don R. Gaskill, to omit 
the alimony provision contained in plaintiff's complaint, the court 
entered its order awarding alimony to plaintiff in the sum of $450 
per month, and that the same constitutes a mistake and error, as 
provided by Rule 60b(7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and that 
the court therefore should allow an amendment and modification of 
the decree of divorce, in conformance with the consent of the said 
defendant, Don R. Gaskill, striking from said decree of divorce 
the provision with regard to alimony, the same to be done nunc pro 
tunc. 
7. That the defendant, Don R. Gaskill, at no time submitted 
his person or intended to submit his person to the jurisdiction of 
this court for purposes of considering or entering any money judg-
ment against him. 
8. That no notice was given to the defendant, Don R. Gaskill, 
that the court would hear, consider or decide the claim for alimony, 
and, consequently, the said defendant did not have the opportunity 
to appear and oppose the claim. 
9. That the defendant, Don R. Gaskill had no notice of the 
judgment against him for alimony until he was served with a motion 
for contempt, and that he immediately upon being so served took 
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steps to bring this matter to the attention of the court by re-
taining counsel. 
WHEREFORE, defendant prays the court to enter its order 
amending and modifying the decree of divorce herein, to strike 
from said decree the provision of said decree awarding to the 
plaintiff alimony in the sum of $450 per month, and to make said 
order effective nunc pro tunc. 
Dated this___^2A__ day of October, 1978. 
Don R. Gaskill ^ 
STATE OF TEXAS 
COUNTY OF HARRIS 
DON R. GASKILL, being first duly sworn upon his oath, 
deposes and states as follows: 
That he is the defendant and petitioner above named; that 
he has read the foregoing petition and knows the contents thereof, 
and that the same is true of his own knowledge, except as to mat-
ters therein stated upon information and belief, and as to those 
matters he believes it to be true. 
Don R. Gaskill 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s ^ i f / ^ 7 day o f 
O c t o b e r , 1 9 7 8 . Y.V -
My Commi&ison Expires: 
Notary P 
County, Texas 
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JOHN E. RUNYAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4625 South 2300 Sast 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: 278=0431 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL 
a/k/a LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, 
DON R. GASKILL, 
CONSENT AND WAIVER 
Civil No. D-J?3&f7 
Defendant. 
) 
) ss. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
DON R. GASKILL, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says: That he is the defendant in the above-entitled action; 
that he acknowledges the receipt of a copy of the Complaint 
in the foregoing action, enters his appearance and consent 
herein, waives service of Summons upon him, waives time 
within which to answer or otherwise plead this said Complaint 
and consents that his default may be entered and that the 
Court may proceed to hear and determine said cause at any 
time and without notice to said 
, 
•i 
V* 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
, 1976. 
day of 
NOTARY PUBLIC // 
Residing at ^ Z ^ W U v ^ u / ^ 
My commission expires: g-/-7$ /?''">? 
MW¥MXXMM>»** 
OFFICIAL SEAL 
BARBARA J. HULSE 
NOTARY PUBLIC • CALIfOANIA 
PRINCIPAL OFFICE IN 
LOS ANUILW CUUNH 
My Commission Expire August 1. 1979 j 
\**wm*<**t< %MK»I»I»'»*»»« »»Ljuirinfu JIU 
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WALTER R ELLETT 
ATTORNEY FOR Defendant 
8086 SOUTH STATC S T R U T 
MURRAY. UTAH 84107 
TBUIPHONC: 266-3878 
Nov I 3 59PM'78 x 
UTV0L?ffif 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERTA PANNEY GASKILL, 
aka LEE or LEA GASKILL 
Plaintiff 
vs . 
No. D-23691 
AMENDED 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
DONR. GASKILL 
Defendant 
* * * 
TO THE PLAINTIFF, and to her attorney, READ R. HELLEWELL: 
YOU AND EACH OF YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that 
the modification hearing in the above entitled matter, heretofore scheduled 
to be heard on Friday, the 10th day of November 1978, at 2:00 p. m. , has 
now been scheduled to be heard on Tuesday, the 21st day of November 1978, 
at 3:30 p. m., before a judge to be assigned. 
Dated this 31st day of October 1978. . 
WATKER R. ELLEQ 
Mailed copy of the foregoing to Read R. Hellewell, Attorney for Plaintiff, 
200 North Main Street - Suite 200, Salt ^ake City, Utah 84103/\his 31st 
day of October 1978. 
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WALTER R. ELI 
ATTORNEY FOR 
8088 S O U T H 6TAT£ S T R U T 
MURRAY, UTAH 84107 
TCLftPHONC: 266-3B7S 
ad ant 
Ul'ilrjkl COUNTY,UTAH 
Nov 14 12 i s ?H '78 
^ DEPUTY CURX 
? 
VJ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DISTRICT THE THIRD IUDJOAL 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKl^STAgrE OF UTAH 
til* 
No. D-23691 
SPECIAL APPEARANCE 
OF COUNSEL 
ALBERT A PANNEY GASKILL, 
aka LEE or LEA GASKILL 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
DON R. GASKILL 
Defendant 
* * * 
Comes now Walter R. Ellett, and specially enters his appear-
ance as counsel for the defendant, Don R. Gaskill, in the above entitled 
matter, lor the specific purpose of challenging, on behalf of the said 
Don 11. Gaskill, the authority of the court to enter a personal judgment 
for alimony in connection with the divorce decree entered in the above 
entitled matter. 
Dated this / 3 ' day of November 1978. 
WALTER R. ELLE1 
rney Appearing/Spec 
Defendant, Don R / G a skill 
Mailed copy of the foregoing to Read R. Hellewell, Attorney for Plaintiff, 
200 North Main Street - Suite 200, SLCU 84103, this 13th dajr of November 
1978. 
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE - STATE OF UTAH 
T ^ Plaintiff \ 
Defendant V 
MINUTE ORDER 
Case# 
Type of hearing: Div_ -Annul-
Pltf.. Deft. Preserft: ^\ niT  ^ u n _J 
P. A„Y <Xc « r X v V . v\«a\V <gU>5\] 
. Atty. 
Sworn & Examined: 
Pitt 
Others. 
.Deft. 
-OSC- -Other-
Summons. 
Waiver 
.Stipulation. 
-Publication.. 
ault: i \ Pltf . ^ . _,_,^
 p 
Date: N Q N r ^ ^ W T ^ 
C l e r k T T ^ ^ ^ K ^
 X V T ^ 
BailiffH^KKA \ P \ ^ 3 -
ORDERS: 
Counseling ordered 
Custody study ordered. 
Custody awarded to 
Visitation rights . Reasonable, or:. 
Support. -per month Alimon 
Payments to be made thru the clerks office 
each month, or 'it by the and % by the-
Atty rees to the in the amount of $ 
Home to Pltf Deft Use of 
S Per month/year 
Payments to be made by the of 
-of each month 
, or Deferred 
Furnishings to Pltf Deft Use of__ 
Auto to Pltf Deft. 
.to pay debts incurred prior to 
.to pay court costs of $ within days 
Divorce granted to_ 
Based on stipulation of cousel or on motion of 
.counsel, the court orders: 
A' v -A-s ( Oi«<-Acb ^ V\.oaQoi*^s-zA5&r~\>S^^ 
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE - STATE OF UTAH 
FILE NO. D 23691 
YlTLE: (-/PARTIES PRESENT) COUNSEL: K COUNSEL PRESENT) 
ABERTA FANNEY GASKILL, a/k/a, 
VS 
DON R. GASKILL 
I II I I 'I li 11 ' T T 
HON. JAMES S . SAWAYA 
JUDGE 
DATE: JULY 2. 1979 
THTS MATTRR HAVTNG HERETOFORE BEEN HEARD BY THIS COURT AND TAKEN UNDERADVISEMENT. COURT 
m j STATER NF.TTHER PARTY HAVING FIXED THE MEMORANDUM ORDERED BY THE COURT ,THE PETITION 
TS DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 
JOAN BLY -
CLERK 
REPORTER 
BAILIFF 
nojj 
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FILE!) 
DISTRICT OOURT 
Dec 10 II28 AH'31 
BRENT D. YOUNG ( 3 5 8 4 ) 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: 375-3000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, aka 
LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant 
STATE OF 
County of 
aanr. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Civil No. -£=2349-1 
ss, ) 
DON R. GASKILL, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am the defendant in the above-entitled case. 
2. I was divorced from Mrs. Gaskill on December 30, 1976, 
3. In October, 1978, Mrs. Gaskill filed a petition 
seeking contempt, and a judgment for delinquent alimony. 
4. I answered the Petition on or about 8 September, 1976, 
and claimed that the consent and waiver which I signed on 8 
September, 1976, had handwritten in my handwriting "omit 
paragraph 8 on complaint". With the understanding, paragraph 
8, which concerned alimony, would be omitted, I signed the 
consent and waiver. Paragraph 8 on the complaint was a claim 
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* 
for alimony in the amount of $450 per month for the balance of 
Mrs. Gaskill's life. 
5. Apparently the matter was argued before the court in 
1978. The court took it under advisement. Neither party 
furnished any written memorandum as requested by the court, and 
the matter, on July 2, 1979, was dismissed without prejudice. 
There has been no activity since then. I have spoken with my 
ex-wife frequently since then. She has never made a claim for 
delinquent alimony until she brought the judgment to the State 
of Washington. 
6. I learned in the last few months that for a period of 
several months in the early 1980s Mrs. Gaskill resided with 
another man. As a defense to her claim for judgment for 
delinquent alimony against me in Washington pursuant to the 
Utah Decree for the amount of many tens of thousands of 
dollars, her deposition was taken. She was asked in that 
deposition whether she has resided with anyone else. She 
refused to answer that question. 
7. I am asking the Utah court to enter an order 
authorizing my attorney to send an exemplified copy of a 
statement by the court to the Washington court providing that: 
(a) I have filed a Petition in the Utah court 
seeking to: 
(1) have the Utah court make a determination as 
2 
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I 
to the validity of that portion of the Decree which 
provides for alimony; 
(2) have the Utah court determine whether by 
her conduct and my conduct Mrs. Gaskill has waived 
her claim for alimony; 
(3) have the Utah court determine whether Mrs. 
Gaskill is statutorily precluded because of the 
allegation that she has lived with another man. 
Dated t h i s o ^ ' day o f /AzsS&*~/<&4~ r , 1 9 9 1 . 
DON R. GASKILL 
. Subscribed and sworn td^ -Cefdre me this 
Notary Public (3 
My Commission Expires: Residing at: 
^ * 7 — ^ .yu M, , „:,,;;{ 
• -•'•."• '•••• : • '.. " ? / 
gaskill/2.12 
'J- v. 
k
 i * ' 
• w «>
 N s> • ' V 
n n r\ A n ft 
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V 
V 
BRENT D. YOUNG (3584) 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: 375-3000 
fill ??> xz-f ?<*:<*<? fs^mv 
Third Juu.ctal District 
DEC 1 0 1991 
'SAULAKEl 
*<? 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, aka 
LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF I'ju, ' > 
County of ', • / • 
co^rn 
-t 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Civil No. .-a-3363-1-
JUDGE JAMES S.SAWAYA 
ss, 
) 
DON R. GASKlCL, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am the defendant in the above-entitled case, 
2. I was divorced from Mrs. Gaskill on December 30, 1976. 
3. In October, 1978, Mrs. Gaskill filed a petition 
seeking contempt, and a judgment for delinquent alimony. 
4. I answered the Petition on or about 8 September, 1976, 
and claimed that the consent and waiver which I signed on 8 
September, 1976, had handwritten in my handwriting "omit 
paragraph 8 on complaint". With the understanding, paragraph 
8, which concerned alimony, would be omitted, I signed the 
consent and waiver. Paragraph 8 on the complaint was n claim 
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for alimony in the amount of $450 per month for the balance of 
Mrs. Gaskill's life. 
5. Apparently the matter was argued before the court in 
1978. The court took it under advisement. Neither party 
furnished any written memorandum as requested by the court, and 
the matter, on July 2, 1979, was dismissed without prejudice. 
There has been no activity since then. I have spoken with my 
ex-wife frequently since then. She has never made a claim for 
delinquent alimony until she brought the judgment to the State 
of Washington. 
6. I learned in the last few months that for a period of 
several months in the early 1980s Mrs. Gaskill resided with 
another man. As a defense to her claim for judgment for 
delinquent alimony against me in Washington pursuant to the 
Utah Decree for the amount of many tens of thousands of 
dollars, her deposition was taken. She was asked in that 
deposition whether she has resided with anyone else. She 
refused to answer that question. 
7.. I am asking the Utah court to enter an order 
authorizing my attorney to send an exemplified copy of a 
statement by the court to the Washington court providing that: 
(a) I have filed a Petition in the Utah court 
seeking to: 
(1) have the Utah court make a determination as 
2 
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1 
to the validity of that portion of the Decree which 
provides for alimony; 
(2) have the Utah court determine whether by 
her conduct and my conduct Mrs. Gaskill has waived 
her claim for alimony; 
(3) have the Utah court determine whether Mrs, 
Gaskill is statutorily precluded because of the 
allegation that she has lived with another man. 
Dated this d?C day of / l<'r^&c
 y , 1991. 
DON R. GASKILL^ 
Subscribed and sworn tdHief^re me this LtJ^*9y /~N\ 
Notary Public _^j 
My Commission Expires: Residing at: 
gaskill/2.12 
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BRENT D. YOUNG (3584) 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O, Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: 375-3000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, aka 
LEE or LEA GASKILL, MOTION FOR 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Civil No. G-2Z&9±-
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant, 
Defendant, by and through his attorney, moves the court 
for an order to show cause why the court should not certify to 
the court in the state of Washington that the following issues 
are before the Utah court: 
(1) Whether there is a valid decree ordering the 
defendant to pay alimony; 
(2) Whether the court should modify nunc pro tunc THE 
decree to reflect the written consent of the defendant which 
did not provide for alimony; 
(3) Whether the plaintiff has abandoned her claim for 
alimony because of her refusal to pursue the issue in 1979; 
(4) Whether the plaintiff has waived her claim for 
alimony based upon her conduct generally; and 
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(5) Whether the plaintiff has, pursuant to Title 30-3-5, 
by her conduct terminated her claim for alimony. 
This motion is based on the affidavit of defendant filed 
herewith. 
Dated this ^ day of . 1991. 
BRENT D. ^ OUNC^ 
otsc/dom/cl4 
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FILED 
DlSTRlC'GOUR1 
U E C I O II25 AH '91 
BRENT D. YOUNG ( 3 5 8 4 ) 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: 375-3000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, aka 
LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
VERIFIED 
PETITION TO MODIFY 
DECREE 
Civil No. D 23691 
.IUDS5 JAMES S. SAWAYA 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
Defendant petitions the court for an order modifying the 
Decree nunc pro tunc, or in the alternative, to modify it by 
terminating alimony effective the date Mrs. Gasklll began 
living with another man. The specific reasons for this 
Petition are set forth as follows: 
1. I am the defendant in the above-entitled case, 
2. I was divorced from Mrs. Gasklll on December 30, 1976. 
3. In October, 1978, Mrs. Gasklll filed a petition 
seeking contempt, and a judgment for delinquent alimony. 
4. I answered the Petition on or about 8 September, 1976, 
and claimed that the consent and waiver which I signed on 8 
September, 1976, had handwritten in my handwriting "omit 
paragraph 8 on complaint". With the understanding, paragraph 
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8, which concerned alimony, would be omitted, I signed the 
consent and waiver. Paragraph 8 on the complaint was a claim 
for alimony in the amount of $450 per month for the balance of 
Mrs. Gaskill's life. 
5. Apparently the matter was argued before the court in 
1978. The court took it under advisement. Neither party 
furnished any written memorandum as requested by the court, and 
the matter, on July 2, 1979, was dismissed without prejudice. 
There has been no activity since then. I have spoken with my 
ex-wife frequently since then. She has never made a claim for 
delinquent alimony until she brought the judgment to the State 
of Washington. 
6. I learned in the last few months that for a period of 
several months in the early 1980s Mrs. Gaskill resided with 
another man. As a defense to her claim for judgment for 
delinquent alimony against me in Washington pursuant to the 
Utah Decree for the amount of many tens of thousands of 
dollars, her deposition was taken. She was asked in that 
deposition whether she has resided with anyone else. She 
refused to answer that question. 
7. I am asking the Utah court to enter an order 
authorizing my attorney to send an exemplified copy of a 
statement by the court to the Washington court providing that: 
(a) I have filed a Petition in the Utah court 
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seeking to: 
(1) have the Utah court make a determination as 
to the validity of that portion of the Decree which 
provides for alimony; 
(2) have the Utah court determine whether by 
her conduct and my conduct Mrs. Gaskill has waived 
her claim for alimony; 
(3) have the Utah court determine whether Mrs. 
Gaskill is statutorily precluded because of the 
allegation that she has lived with another man. 
WHEREFORE plaintiff prays as follows: 
(1) To have the Utah court make a determination as to the 
validity of that portion of the Decree which provides for 
alimony; 
(2) To have the Utah court determine whether by 
plaintiff's conduct and defendant's conduct Mrs. Gaskill has 
waived her claim for alimony; 
(3) To have the Utah court determine whether Mrs. Gaskill 
is statutorily precluded because of the allegation that she has 
lived with another man; 
(4) For such other and further relief as the court deems 
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jus t in the premises. 
Dated th is 3£ day of _ ^ 4 ^ * ^ . <r i- 1 9 9 1 . 
DON 
BRENT D. YOUNG if 
STATE OF (/OflSh'nCVlftTPl 
County of Kj 'n f l< ss. ) 
DON R. GASKILL, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he is the person who executed the foregoing instrument; 
that he has read the same and knows the contents thereof; that 
the matters stated therein are true of his own knowledge, 
except such matters as stated to be upon information and 
belief, and as to those matters, he believes them to be true. 
ubscribed and sworn to S c 
of K\h/^fY)lX<-<. 1991. 
My Commission Expires: 
• IP- / -^4 
petition/dom/c8-ll 
Notary Public 
Residing a t : 
..-
 N\v . ..'• x> 'it 
-• v ' • ' . v ' v h 
•3 
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HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247) 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-6996 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, a/k/a 
LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF CONTINUANCE 
OF HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Civil No. 764923691 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
•ooOoo-
TO: Defendant, DON R. GASKILL, and his attorney of record, BRENT 
D. YOUNG. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the hearing on Defendant's Order to 
Show Cause originally scheduled for January 13, 1992, has been 
continued to January 29, 1992 at the hour of 2:00 p.m., before the 
Honorable Commissioner Michael Evans, or as soon thereafter as 
counsel may be heard. 
DATED this 10th day of January, 1992. 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF CONTINUANCE OF HEARING ON 
DEFENDANT'S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, by placing same in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, on this 10th day of January, 1992, 
addressed to: 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
Kay J. Slahtasky 
gasklll.ncon 
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EILEO 
DlSTRlcf C0UR1 
BRENT D. YOUNG (3584) . ir 8 57 1\M '3Z 
I VIE fi YOUNG ilAH IU Di H 
Attorneys for Plaintiff ]Hihi>o » l P^l^L 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: 375-3000 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, aka 
LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
SUMMONS 
Civil No. J) ^Sb^l 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: 
You are hereby summoned and required to file an answer in 
writing to the attached Complaint with the Clerk of the 
above-entitled court, Utah County Courthouse, 125 N. 100 West, 
Provo, Utah, 84601, and to serve upon, or mail to BRENT D. 
YOUNG, at 48 North University Avenue, Provo, Utah, plaintiff's 
attorney, a copy of said answer, within (thirty) 30 days after 
service of this summons upon you. 
If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken 
against you for the relief demanded in said Complaint, which 
has been filed with the Clerk of said court and a copy of which 
is attached hereto and herewith served upon you. 
D a t e d : XL 7 . 1 9 9 1 . 
P l e a s e s e r v e : y x 
Defendant Pia"VitTt 
BTRENT D. YOUNG A 
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BRENT D. YOUNG (3584) r!|-() ] Q iCf) 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant -^i !u..tcou;rY 
48 North University Avenue L' 
p . o . BOX 672 «.r,-,.;~r" 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: 375-3000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, aka 
LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
TO THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF: 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE. ~, 
Civil No. P-aa6Ql 
Jul?!?*. JAMES S. SAWAYA 
You are hereby ordered to appear before the 
above-entitled court at the County Courthouse, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, on the l^ih ddiA of U&OUtU-iy 19?#^ 
at cJ- <vQ /p .m», then and there to show cause, if any 
you have, why the court should not certify to the court in the 
state of Washington that the following issues are before the 
Utah court: 
(1) Whether there is a valid decree ordering the 
defendant to pay alimony; 
(2) Whether the court should modify nunc pro tunc THE 
decree to reflect the written consent of the defendant which 
did not provide for alimony; 
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(3) Whether the plaintiff has abandoned her claim for 
alimony because of her refusal to pursue the issue in 1979; 
(4) Whether the plaintiff has waived her claim for 
alimony based upon her conduct generally; and 
(5) Whether the plaintiff has, pursuant to Title 30-3-5, 
by her conduct terminated her claim for alimony. 
These claims of the defendant and the relief prayed for 
are particularly described in ths affidavit served herewith. 
This ordsr and tVxe affidavit v/ill be served upon you at least 
five days prior to the day above specified. 
Dated: JL1PC( -'iAi /P, 
BV'THE 
Please serve: 
Plaintiff 
otsc/dom/12 
^ 
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YO'JNtf & YUUNG 
P.'J. UUX b/2 
PRUVU, U I' 846UJ 
Te lephone: (ouu) OOU uuoo 
A t to rney f o r ; ALBfcKI' i"ANNLY GASK1LL 
IhiKU U1£S"« RIC'l CUURI 
P l a ih t ' l f f ; ALdtiKTA hANNfcY uASKiLL 
Defendant : UUN K. CASK ILL , LI AL 
htiai m g : 01 /VJ /92 U2:UU 
Proof of Service 
Case No. D23691 
Pile No, 91-0U7b83-Q 
1. At the tlpie of service i was at least 18 years of age and not a party to 
this action, and : served copies of the: 
SUMMONS AND UKUfcR 10 SHOW CAUSfc 
Party served: ALbtKVA PANNLY GASK1LL, AKA 
LLL UK LtA CASK1LL 
2bU0 SPRINGS KU. 32 b 2 
VALLtJU, CA. 94b91 
3. I served the party named In Item 2 
a. by personally delivering the copies 
11 ) on (.date) : 12-25-91 
(2; at (time ) : 1 i :b8 a.m. 
4. Notice to the Person Served (on the Summons) was completed as follows: 
a. As an individual defendant. 
b. Person serving: PA! RICK riANZLR 
County of Solano 
boU union avenue, Ste 10U 
l-au field/ CA 94b33 
6. Service Fee: $20.00 
Phone: (707) 421-7020 
7. i am a California sherirr and i certify that the foregoing 1s true 
and correct. 
Date: DtCfcMBfcK 'I'll '.yj't 
J ud . Coun . I or m , r u 1 e y 8 2 (.-.•« ) ( 2 J ) Sher 
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HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247) 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-6996 
iL^ 
Pl..-r^T00U^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, a/k/a 
LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO 
DEFENDANT'S VERIFIED 
PETITION TO MODIFY 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 764923691 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
ooOoo 
Plaintiff, ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, aka LEA GASKILL, by and 
through her attorney, Helen E. Christian, hereby files this Answer 
to Defendant's Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, and 
responds as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Defendant's Verified Petition to Modify Decree fails to state 
a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Defendant's Verified Petition to Modify Decree fails to allege 
a substantial change of circumstances that has occurred that would 
justify modification of the Decree of Divorce entered in this 
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action. 
ANSWER 
1. Plaintiff admits the allegations contained in Paragraphs 
1 and 2 of Defendant's Petition. 
2. Plaintiff admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 
3 of Defendant's Petition, and affirmatively states that she has 
tried to collect alimony arrearages from the Defendant in the past, 
but has been unsuccessful. 
3. Plaintiff denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 
4 of Defendant's Petition, and affirmatively states that Paragraph 
8 of the Complaint for Divorce contained a claim for alimony in the 
amount of $750.00 until Plaintiff had completed cosmetology school, 
and then the amount of $450.00 thereafter until such time as 
Plaintiff remarried or died. 
4. Plaintiff admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 
5 of Defendant's Petition to the extent that this matter was before 
the Court in 1978, but denies the remainder of that paragraph. 
5. Plaintiff denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 
6 of Defendant's Petition and affirmatively states that even ij[ she 
had cohabited with a member of the opposite sex for a few months in 
the early 1980s, Defendant is now barred from basing his failure to 
pay alimony to Plaintiff on those grounds. 
6. Plaintiff is without sufficient information as to the 
truth or falsity of the allegations contained in Paragraph 7 of 
2 
i 
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Defendant's Petition, and therefore denies the same, 
7. Plaintiff denies each and every other allegation not 
specifically herein admitted, modified or denied. 
WHEREFORE, Having responded to the allegations contained in 
Defendant's Verified Petition to Modify Decree, Plaintiff prays 
that the same be dismissed and that Defendant take nothing thereby. 
DATED this day of January, 1992. 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
lU^_ ?, 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF TELECOPIER AND MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be faxed and mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO DEFENDANT'S 
VERIFIED PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE by placing same in 
the United States rnai', postage prepaid, on this day of 
January, 1992, addressee to: 
Brent D. Your 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys fc Defendant 
48 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Kay J. Slahtasky 
ga0ki.11.an8 
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HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247) 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-6996 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, a/k/a 
LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 764923691 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
ooOoo :— 
Plaintiff, ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, a/k/a LEA GASKILL, by and 
through her attorney, Helen E. Christian, hereby files this 
response in opposition to Defendant's Motion for Order to Show 
Cause. 
PERTINENT FACTS 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced by a Decree of 
Divorce entered in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, on December 30, 1976, in Case No. D23691, by Judge 
James S. Sawaya. 
2. The Decree of Divorce provided, among other things, that 
Defendant was ordered to pay alimony to Plaintiff in the amount of 
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$450.00 per month, "for the remainder of her life" or until 
Plaintiff remarried, at which time alimony payments would cease. 
3. Prior to entry of the Decree of Divorce, Defendant 
executed a Consent and Waiver, a copy of which is attached hereto 
as Exhibit "B", wherein he waived the time within which to answer 
or otherwise plead to the allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint for 
Divorce, consented that his default may be entered , and that the 
Court could proceed to hear the matter without further notice to 
him. 
4. Defendant claims that the handwritten notation on the 
Consent and Waiver he signed, which reads "omit #8 on Complaint", 
is a sufficient basis upon which to deny alimony to Plaintiff. 
5. Defendant has failed to pay any amount of alimony to 
Plaintiff, and the arrearages from the date of the first payment, 
January 1, 1977 through January 1, 1992, a period of fifteen years, 
would be $81,000, plus interest on those amounts as each payment 
became due and payable. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant asks this Court to determine whether there is a 
valid Decree of Divorce requiring him to pay alimony to the 
Plaintiff. Defendant executed his Consent and Waiver in this 
action on September 8, 1976, almost four months before the hearing 
held before Judge Sawaya on the divorce. Plaintiff testified at 
that hearing that she had asked in her Complaint for alimony in the 
2 
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amount of $750.00 per month until she completed her schooling/ and 
the amount of $450.00 to continue after that time until she 
remarried or died, but that she wanted the Court to enter its award 
of $450.00 per month from the commencement of the award instead. 
Defendant is estopped, nearly sixteen years later, from 
claiming that he should not have been required to pay alimony to 
Plaintiff. Notwithstanding Defendant's handwritten statement on 
the Consent and Waiver/ he did execute that document and waived his 
rights to contest the allegations in the Complaint filed by 
Plaintiff. 
Defendant is further estopped from seeking relief from this 
Court as he comes before it with unclean hands, having failed to 
pay any amount of alimony as ordered in the Decree of Divorce. 
Defendant next claims that Plaintiff has waived her right to 
alimony for several reasons. First, he claims that she has waived 
her right to alimony because she failed to pursue the Motion she 
brought before the Court in 1978, asking the Court to find 
Defendant in contempt for his failure to pay alimony and to award 
her judgment for the arrearages owing up to that time. This 
argument is simply without basis in law or fact, and the fact that 
Plaintiff failed to pursue an enforcement action, for whatever 
reason, does not constitute a waiver of her right to do. so in the 
future. 
Second, Defendant claims that Plaintiff has waived her right 
3 
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to alimony because of her conduct generally, but fails to state any 
specific examples of her conduct. If Defendant refers to 
Plaintiff's conduct in attempting to seek enforcement of her right 
to alimony in the State of Washington, a recipient's right to 
enforce an award of alimony does not constitute conduct that would 
justify its termination. On the other hand, Defendant's conduct 
has been contemptible throughout these proceedings, as he has 
failed to comply with the Order of the Court. 
Finally, Defendant claims that Plaintiff has waived her right 
to alimony because Defendant believes that Plaintiff was, at one 
time during the pendency of Defendant's alimony obligation, 
residing with a member of the opposite sex. Defendant cites 
S 30-3- 5, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) in support of his 
position. Defendant finds support in the following language of 
that section: 
(6) Any order of the court that a 
party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the 
party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is* residing with a person of 
the opposite sex. . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
There are two problems with Defendant's claim that Plaintiff 
has terminated her right to alimony under this section. First, 
Defendant failed to establish that Plaintiff was residing with a 
person of the opposite sex, and second, Defendant was required to 
establish that fact at the time of the alleged cohabitation. His 
4 
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failure to do either one is fatal to Defendant's claim under this 
section. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant has failed to pay alimony to Plaintiff for a period 
of sixteen years. Defendant now seeks to avoid paying alimony to 
Plaintiff by making claims that are without merit and not supported 
by fact or law. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against 
Defendant for alimony arrearages that have accrued since entry of 
the Decree of Divorce, including interest on each payment as it 
became due# as well as her attorney's fees and costs incurred in 
defending against this action. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff asks this Court to award her the 
following relief: 
1. Deny Defendant's Motion for Order to Show Cause; 
2. Award judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against 
Defendant in the amount of the alimony arrearages owing, including 
interest on each payment as it became due and payable; 
3. Award judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against 
Defendant for Plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs incurred in 
defending against this action in the amount of $450.00; and 
4. Award Plaintiff such other and further relief as the 
Court deems just and proper in the premises. 
5 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this l \ day of January, 1992, 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF TELECOPIER AND MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be faxed and mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND MOTION 
FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT, by placing same in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid, on thlScOl day of January, 1992, addressed to: 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
gasklll.ropp 
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HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247) 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-6996 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, a/k/a 
LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF HEARING ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 764923691 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
-ooOoo-
TO: Defendant, DON R. GASKILL, and his attorney of record, BRENT 
D. YOUNG 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the a hearing on PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT has been scheduled for January 29, 1992, at 
the hour of 2:00 p.m., before the Honorable Commissioner Michael 
Evans, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. 
DATED this TA^day of January, 1992. 
GUSTIN, GREEN, STEGALL & L] 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF TELECOPIER AND MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be faxed and mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT, by placing same in the United States 
mail/ postage prepaid, on thlsrO 1 day of January, 1992, addressed 
to: 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
gaekill.nhea 
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S&. v -v. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GASKILL, ALBERTA FANNEY 
. PLAINTIFF 
VS 
GASKILL, DON R 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY .: a 
CASE NUMBER 764923691 DA I 
DATE 01/29/92 ? :". 
HONORABLE MICHAEI, S, EVANS 
COURT REPORTER TAPE-l-*19$22-f 2«7 
COURT CLERK CPW 
TYPE OF HEARING: MOTION HEARING 
PRESENT: DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. CHRISTIAN, HELEN 
D. ATTY. YOUNG, BRENT 
# 
! 
COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS: £ -:M- '-:• 
1. PURSUANT TO AGREEMENT OF COUNSEL, COMMISSIONER WILL HEAR 
ARGUMENT ON SPECIFIC ISSUES IDENTIFIED ON THE RECORD & 
COMMISSIONER TO MAKE HIS RECOMMENDATIONS ON THOSE ISSUES,• 
2. COUNSEL ALSO AGREED THAT DISCOVERY CONTINUE BEYOND THE DATE 
OF THE ENTRY OF COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATIONS. -
3. COUNSEL AGREED THAT RECOMMENDATION NOT HAVE THE EFFECT OF — 
ORDER OF COURT FOR 10 DAYS TIME AND THEN BE ENTERED UNLESS ; 
SOMEONE HAS FILED OBJECTION TO RECOMMENDATION, IN THAT 
EVENT ENTRY OF RECOMMENDATION BE STAYED PENDING FURTHER ORDER 
FROM JUDGE SAWAYA. 
4. COMMISSIONER WILL TAKE THESE ISSUES UNDER ADVISEMENT & RE^ 
VIEW FILE AND REVIEW DEFT'S MOST RECENT PLEADINGS AND PLTF 
ALLOWED TO FILE RESPONSIVE MEMORANDUM IN MANNER INDICATED 
BY FEB. 7TH, 5 PM. IF DEFT UPON RECEIPT OF SUPPLEMENTAL 
RESPONSES BELIEVES IT IS APPROPRIATE TO FILE SOME OTHER RE-
SPONSE, THE DEFT NOTIFY-CLERK AND COMMISSIONER WILL NOT IS-
SUE RECOMMENDATION UNTIL COMMISSIONER CONDUCTS TELEPHONE 
CONFERENCE WITH BOTH COUNSEL. 
* 
$ 
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HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247) 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-6996 
Rim FTT.VT *SVTT. 
Third • • .\i v • A 
FEB 0 7 1992 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL a/k/a 
LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF 
IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION 
FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 764923691 
Judge James S. Sawaya DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
ooOoo 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN, counsel of record for the above-named 
Plaintiff hereby files a facsimiled copy of the AFFIDAVIT OF 
PLAINTIFF IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT. The 
original Affidavit will be filed at a later date. 
DATED this _3l_ aay of February, 1992. 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
2LEN~~E .CHRISTIAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
n"r\r\r.Q 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF IN SUPPORT OF HER 
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT by placing same in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid, on this day of February, 1992, 
addressed to: 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
Kay J. Slahtaskj 
gaakill.2aff 
nnon^.7 
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Third Judicial District 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247) 
AUSTIN & CHRISTIAN . FEB 0 7 1992 
Attorney* for P la int i f f 
Third Floor, New York Buildino _ S A t r U A K E C O U N T Y 
48 Poet Office ?iace * — 
Salt Lake City/ Utah 84101 o^c** 
Telephone: (801)532-6996 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 8ALT LAK£ COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
-••---ooOoo— 
ALBERTA FANNEY QAflKILL a/k/a , 
LEE or LEA GASXILL,
 : APPIDAVIT OP PLAINTir? 
.,_.„*iff • " L S U P P 0 R T 0 F H E R MOTION 
naintifl, , FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
i 
v
* J C 4 v 1 1 No» 764923691 
DON R. GASXILL, ! judge Jameg
 S. saweya 
Defendant. I 
-ooOoo-
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
IBS 
COUNTY OF ________ ) 
ALEERTA FANNEY GASXILL a/k/a LEE or LEA GASKILL, Being first 
upon her oath duly sworn, deposes and states: 
1. I am the Plaintiff named in the above-entitled action, 
and I have been divorced from the Defendant above-named, DON R, 
GASXILL, since December 30, 1976. 
2. The Decree of Divorce awarded me alimony in the amount of 
$450.00 par month which the Defendant was ordered to pay, but 
Defendant has failed and refused to pay alimony as ordered. 
3. I have personal knowledge of the information contained in 
thia Affidavit, and believe that Defendant has had the financial 
f\ r\ ss. -~. _- _ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ability to pay alimony as he was self-employed as a General 
Contractor until his recent retirement. 
4. fly the time of our divorce in 1976/ the Defendant had 
moved from the State of Utah and, between 1976 and the time I 
sought enforcement of the alimony award In 1578, I repeatedly asked 
Defendant to provide financial assistance to me and pay the alimony 
a» ordered by the Court. 
5< The action brought in 1978 was never completed for 
reasons unknown to me, and th« court dismissed the action withcut 
prejudice. 
.!••• Defendant remarried in 1977 or 1978 and told me that his 
new wife would not allow him to pay alimony to me. 
7* After Defendant divorced his second wife/ he contacted ma 
approximately six times/ and I again asked him to pay alimony to mo 
and he refused. 
8. Defendant moved to Seattle, Washington, remarried for tha 
jjecond time, and several years passed without any communication 
between us. 
9. Defendant told our children over the years that ha was 
ttfraid to visit them in Utah because I would have him "thrown in 
jail" because he had not paid me any alimony. 
10. Contrary to Defendant's assertions in his affidavit that 
there were several timea we could have discussed the issue of 
alimony when we were together, Defendant and 1 have never talked 
2 
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privately aheui^ -tfco issue of aUsteny. On one occasion to which 
Defendant refers, we were both present at a family party, at our 
children's request, on Christmas Eve in either 1984 or 1985, but we 
did not talk privately between us. 
11. I have not addressed the issue of alimony with Defendant 
when we have been together because we have always been in the 
presence of our children, and X did not feel that it was 
appropriate to discuss this matter in their presence. 
12. As to Defendant's allegations that I have cohabited air.ce 
our divorce, that is simply untrue. Although I have had 
relationships with men, and I have had men spend the night in my 
residence or I have spent the night in their residence, I have 
never cohabited with an unrelated male, have never combined <uy 
household with & man's household, nor has a man lived with ma in my 
household. 
13. 2 moved from the State of Utah in 1985 and have eir.ce 
attempted to collect the judgment for alimony arrearages in the. 
State of Washington, although Defendant seeke to have this Court 
declare Judge Sawaya's Order invalid* 
14. X have suffered tremendously over the yeairs due to 
Defendant's failure to pay alimony as he was ordered to do, and as 
he knew he was ordered to do, and believe that I am entitled to 
Judgment against him for the amounts owing to me. 
3 
onoono 
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th. W « t e t .hould ^ 
com, P y y a t t « a »r . f « M4 
FURTHER AfFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED ,hi. _£_
 d a y of f e b r u a r y ( 1 M 2 
l»M. 
*<Nnrf^gQwrni •*• • 
- A OFFICIAL SEAL 
LOUISE YVONNE HARP 
NoToryftjb<I<>Calitomla 
SOUNOCOUNFY 
My Commiwlon bpircti 
January 26,1994 
M^Commission Expires• 
'i 
nnnnm 
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CERTIFICATE OF KMIIKO 
I h . r r ty cer t i fy t t a t I c a u s * to M ««il«* • t rue «tf =° r r . e t 
„ p y o* t h . f o r . g 0 i n 9 » « > « « OF tUXKXrt I* IUFFOM OF HSR 
MOTIOH FOR F.NTAV OF JUDGMENT by placing — 1» « » u n i t - S f t . s 
**!, p o , « , .
 Pr .P«id, on t h U _ _ <"F «« F*b™ry, 1 » 1 . 
addresied tfit 
1«kiU.«ff 
BRENT 0. YOUNG 
IVIB L YOUNG 
Attorney* for Defendant 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. BOX 672 
Prove. UT 84603 
Kay J. Slahtaaky 
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,r,4 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247) 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-6996 
FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
: MAR ?3 \^% 
THIRD JUDiUlAL DISTRICT 
-j SALTL4HB'!CfljjilT 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL a/k/a 
LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF 
IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION 
FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 764923691 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
-ooOoo-
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF ) 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL a/k/a LEE or LEA GASKILL, Being first 
upon her oath duly sworn, deposes and states: 
1. I am the Plaintiff named in the above-entitled action, 
and I have been divorced from the Defendant above-named, DON R. 
GASKILL, since December 30, 1976. 
2. The Decree of Divorce awarded me alimony in the amount of 
$450.00 per month which the Defendant was ordered to pay, but 
Defendant has failed and refused to pay alimony as ordered. 
3. I have personal knowledge of the information contained in 
this Affidavit, and believe that Defendant has had the financial 
nf\r\r\n^ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ability to pay alimony as he was self-employed as a General 
Contractor until his recent retirement. 
4. By the time of our divorce in 1976, the Defendant had 
moved from the State of Utah and, between 1976 and the time I 
sought enforcement of the alimony award in 1978, I repeatedly asked 
Defendant to provide financial assistance to me and pay the alimony 
as ordered by uhe Court. 
5. The action brought in 1978 was never completed for 
reasons unknown to me, and the court dismissed the action without 
prejudice. 
6. Defendant remarried in 1977 or 1978 and told me that his 
new wife would not allow him to pay alimony to me. 
7. After Defendant divorced his second wife, he contacted me 
approximately six times, and I again asked him to pay alimony to me 
and he refused. 
8. Defendant moved to Seattle, Washington, remarried for the 
second time, and several years passed without any communication 
between us. 
9. Defendant told our children over the years that he was 
afraid to visit them in Utah because I would have him "thrown in 
jail" because he had not paid me any alimony. 
10. Contrary to Defendant's assertions in his affidavit that 
there were several times we could have discussed the issue of 
alimony when we were together, Defendant and I have never talked 
2 
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privately. On one occasion to which Defendant refers, we were both 
present at a family party, at our children's request, on Christmas 
Eve in either 1984 or 1985, but we did not talk privately between 
us. 
11. I have not addressed the issue of alimony with Defendant 
when we have been together because we have always been in the 
presence of our children, and I did not feel that it was 
appropriate to discuss this matter in their presence. 
12. As to Defendant's allegations that I have cohabited since 
our divorce, that is simply untrue. Although I have had 
relationships with men, and I have had men spend the night in my 
residence or I have spent the night in their residence, I have 
never cohabited with an unrelated male, have never combined my 
household with a man's household, nor has a man lived with me in my 
household. 
13. 1 moved from the State of Utah in 1985 and have since 
attempted to collect the judgment for alimony arrearages in the 
State of Washington, although Defendant seeks to have this Court 
declare Judge Sawaya's Order invalid. 
14. I have suffered tremendously over the years due to 
Defendant's failure to pay alimony as he was ordered to do, and as 
he knew he was ordered to do, and believe that I am entitled to 
judgment against him for the amounts owing to me. 
3 
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15. This Is the third time I have had to retain the services 
of an attorney to assist me in obtaining alimony, and believe that 
the Defendant should be ordered to pay my attorney's fees and 
costs. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED this ¥ day of February, 1992. 
6^XJ 
ALBERTA" F A N N E Y " G A S K I L L a/k/a 
LEE OR LEAiGASKILL 
1992. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before roe this P7 day of February, 
n j " r a n c , s T. Stiles . 
BNOMnv PUBLIC. CAUFORNJ 
^l^^wnu^ri tugs J 
My Commission Expires 
TARY PUBLIC^RSsiding in 
— ^ County 
State of California 
STATE OP CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY OF _*M*-<t*yi~*' J ss. 
On " ^ y Y a A y ^ / / V 9 2 > befwre me, the, undersigned, a Notary Public in and for 
*, farsonally appeared ^ ^ M*r*J?Jtt said State, 
,personally known to me or 
proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be 
the person_ whose name L* subscribed to the within 
instrument and acknowledged that lJU jeiecuted the same 
WITNESS my hand ^nd official seal 
Signature 
OFFICIAL SEAL 
Francis T. Stiles 
(NOTARY PUBLIC • CALIFORNIA 
SOLANO COUNTY 
My Comm. Expires May 2.1995 
r\ r\ r\ r\ r* **. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF IN SUPPORT OF HER 
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT by placing same in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid, on this c^ p M day of February, 1992# 
addressed to: 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
Kay J. Slahtasky 
gaakUl.aff 
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HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247) 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-6996 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL a/k/a 
LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS 
AND FIRM AFFILIATION 
Civil No. 764923691 
Judge James S. Sawaya DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
ooOoo 
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT AND ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD: 
COMES NOW, HELEN E. CHRISTIAN, formerly of GUSTIN, GREEN 
STEGALL & LIAPIS, hereby gives notice that her address, telephone 
number and firm affiliation, effective as of February 15, 1992 is: 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Suite 722, Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
All notices, pleadings, papers, correspondence and other documents 
should be sent to me at the firm and address shown above. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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14-DATED this ^ -* day of March, 1992. 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
4s^JL 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS AND FIRM 
AFFILIATION by placing same in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, on this ^ )Lr:aay of March, 1992, addressed to: 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
IVIE S. YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
gaakill.chadd 
f> r\ A f\ r> r 
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F M R W5TMCT COUBT 
Third Judicial District 
BRENT D. YOUNG (3584) 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84601 
Telephone: 375-3000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL, 
aka LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
RELEASE AND ORDER OF TAPES 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
OBTAINING A TRANSCRIPT OF 
HEARING 
Case No. 764923691 
Commissioner Michael Evans 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
1. You are hereby requested to release the tape/s of the 
hearing set forth below to . 
for the purpose of obtaining a transcript, to be sent to the 
following upon completion: 
Brent D. Young 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
2. This request is for a transcript of a preliminary 
hearing in the above entitled case, held on January 29, 1992, 
at 2:00 p.m. before Commissioner Evans. 
3. The matter was before the court for a hearing on 
plaintiff's motion for entry of judgment. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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4. Cost of the transcript will be paid by Brent D. Young. 
5. Case No. 764923691, Tape No. D23691 at Counter . 
Dated this \% day of \i\k\/ , 1992. 
^ 
BY THE COURT: 
MICHAEL EVANS, Commissioner 
/Uw^- / 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this 7* day of May, 1992, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Release and 
Order of Tapes for the Purpose of Obtaining a Transcript, to 
the following, by placing it in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Helen E. Christian 
Attorney at Law 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48.Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 ^ } 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
trnscrpt/formsp/c 
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fchirfc Circuit Court 
May 18, 1992 
Penny C. Abbott 
3241 South 4840 West 
West Valley City, UT 84120 
Case No. 764923691 
Gaskill vs Gaskill 
Brent D. Young has requested a transcript of tapes used for 
court proceedings on January 29, 1992. 
Enclosed you will find 1 original cassette tape(s), 
number(s) 1-19:25-4 2:17, and a copy of the request. 
Please prepare a transcript of the testimony on these tapes 
and return the original tapes and transcript to Carolyn Weber -
Third Circuit Court Building, 451 South 200 East, Room 340, 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111. Please submit billing to Brent D. 
Young. 
MAILING ADDRESS 
Brent D. Young 
Ivie & Young 
Attorney for Defendant 
4 8 North University Avenue 
PO Box 672 
Provo, UT 84601 
Thank you 
ZA AngelafTfalcer 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Salt Lake Department 
*9h C_ 
1 Vp.iflllK h! 
I.:V:I..M 
(.tiv, ( ' I . I J .MI I I 
,1) C H K'4 
Mmr;iy I \ | .tmik-ni 
V . J South M.iu- St rev t 
Muri.iy, (Ju l . M107 
li , .nc (801 )J(»I-0561 
West Valley IVpamnent 
1616 South 2700 WCM 
West ViillcyCJiiy, U i ; ihMM9 
Phone (801)533-7889 
Sandy I Vpartmcnt 
86S0S.mil. 440 C M 
SanJ\, Utah 84070 
Phonc(80l)5U-7SS* 
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BRENT D. YOUNG (3584) 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: 375-3000 
KLEB DIST82ST CGIB7 
Third Judicial District 
J UN 121992 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
AFFIDAVIT OF DON R. 
GASKILL IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE 
Civil.No. D 23691 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, aka 
LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Utah ) 
DON R. GASKILL, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am the defendant in the above-entitled case. 
2. I was divorced in 1976 from Mrs. Gaskill. 
3. Since that time I was informed once of plaintiff's 
claim for alimony. This occurred in 1978 when I was served 
with the documents asserting her claim for $6,000 in alimony. 
4. Fron the time I signed the Waiver, 8 September, 1976, 
I have assumed and taken the position that I do not owe alimony. 
5. I have seen Mrs. Gaskill several times since the 
divorce. I saw her at our granddaughter's graduation (Heather) 
in Sandy, Utah a few years ago. We visited for some time. She 
000073 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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/T\x 
did not mention alimony. 
6. I saw her at Michelle's home at a Christmas party six 
or seven years ago. She did not mention alimony. 
7. I saw her on on several occasions at Lori's home. She 
never mentioned alimony. 
8. About one year ago I saw her in Vallejo, California. 
We went to dinner with our children Dan and Kim. We visited 
for several hours that day. She did not then and has not ever 
mentioned alimony. 
Dated and signed this day of January, 1992. 
DON R. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^L / day of 
January, 1992. M2f/- />Jt A jgf**^ 
Notary 
-92 V g a s k i l l 2 / 2 . 1 2 
;!^.f Exp. £-23-92 V* 
WAfiGJE R0S8/NS « 
1VHC5 Of ^}^S 
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TOED orcrzuff CCT? 
Third JuJulaf Dblrlct 
JUN 1 * 1992 
BRENT D. YOUNG (3584) 
I VIE & YOUNG ^SALTUK^UM^ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: 375-3000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT C IRT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE jF UTAH ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, aka 
LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. D 23691 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
Defendant answers plaintiff Motion for Entry of Judgment 
as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's Motion fails to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's claim is barred by laches, estoppel, and 
waiver. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's claim is barred by plaintiff's cohabitation 
with another individual. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's claim >r a substantial portion of it 
(78-12-22) is barred by Statute of Limitations. 
f\ r\ r\ /i — — 
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FIFTH DEFENSE 
1. Defendant admits the allegations contained in 
paragraph 1. 
2. In answering paragraph 2 defendant admits the Decree 
so provides but denies the validity of that portion of the 
Decree. 
3. In answering paragraph 3 defendant alleges that he 
made a contract to submit to jurisdiction of the Utah Court 
provided no alimony would be awarded. 
4. Defendant admits the allegations contained in 
paragraph 4. 
5. In answering paragraph 5 defendant denies that he owes 
alimony, but alleges that if he does, it would only be from 
eight (8) years from the filing of the motion which tolled the 
statute of limitations. (78-12-22 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended). 
Dated this £ o day of January, 1992. 
BRENT D. YOUNG 0 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the day of January, 1992, I 
hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer 
to Motion for Entry of Judgment, to Helen Christian, Attorney 
for Plaintiff. 
wr 
BRENT D. YOUNC 
gaskilll/2.12 
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Thifd JwiiW-lal District 
JUN 1 r. 1992 
^ V v o ^ N G (3584) /«|g» 
Attorneys for Defendant By j, s&^-^ b^epuiyUml 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: 375-3000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, aka 
LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF PETITION TO MODIFY 
DECREE 
Civil No. D 23691 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
INTRODUCTION 
Mrs. Gaskill filed a foreign judgment in the state of 
Washington on or about 20 August, 1991. There she seeks to 
execute on a judgment for many tens of thousands of dollars. 
Mr. Gaskill filed a petition in Utah in November of 1991 
seeking an adjudication as to the validity of the Decree which 
provides for alimony. There is no judgment for delinquent 
alimony in the Utah Court. He claims the Decree is 
inconsistent with the terms of the Consent and Waiver. He also 
alleges waiver, estopple and cohabitation as grounds to 
terminate or to have alimony terminated. 
^00077 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
FACTS 
1. The defendant, Mr. Don R. Gaskill, a resident then of 
California, signed a consent and waiver to appear before the 
above-entitled court on 8 September, 1976. 
2. The consent "waives time within which to answer or 
otherwise plead this said Complaint and consents that his 
default may be entered ..." 
3. The complaint specifically dealt with all property 
issues and referred to agreements between the parties in the 
following particulars: 
Paragraph 6: That the plaintiff and defendant have 
made a physical division of all property belonging to each 
other..• 
Paragraph 7: That the plaintiff and defendant are in 
the process of resolving debts and claims arising out of 
the construction, fire and sheriff sale and subsequent 
sale of redemption on property located in North Layton, 
and upon the payment of outstanding bills arising 
therefrom plaintiff, by agreement of plaintiff and 
defendant, is to retain the proceeds as her sole and 
exclusive property. (Emphasis added) 
Paragraph 10: That the plaintiff and defendant 
agreed that attorney fees ... (Emphasis added) 
4. The consent and waiver has handwritten in Mr. 
Gaskill's handwriting "Omit #8 on Complaint". (Affidavit of 
Don Gaskill, dated 30 December, 1991). 
5. A Judgment and Decree was entered on 30 December 
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1976. The Decree provided the provision in paragraph 8 which 
awarded alimony. 
6. On 6 October, 1978, the plaintiff, Mrs. Gaskill, filed 
a motion for order to show cause seeking $6,000 as a judgment 
against Mr. Gaskill for delinquent alimony. 
7. On October 31, 1978, Mr. Gaskill responded and 
contended that he wrote "omit para. 8 on Complaint". He 
claimed the Decree should be set aside as provided by Rule 
60(b)(7). Mr. Gaskill also raised the issue of subject matter 
jurisdiction. (Affidavit of Don Gaskill dated 23 October, 
1978, paragraphs 6 and 7). 
8. Mr. Gaskillfs affidavit was denominated "Affidavit in 
Support of Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce." 
9. The matter was scheduled to be heard on 21 November 
1978 at 3:30. 
10. The file does not show a response to Mr. Gaskill!s 
"Affidavit in Support of Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce." 
11. The court dismissed Mrs. Gaskillfs Petition on July 
2, 1979 stating "Neither party having filed the memorandua 
ordered by the court, the petition is dismissed without 
prejudice." 
12. On August 19, 1991, more than 12 1/2 years later, 
Mrs. Gaskill filed in Superior Court of Washington County, 
State of Washington, claiming delinquent alimony. 
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ARGUMENT 
The facts relied upon for this memorandum set forth above 
are undisputed and come from the record. Mr. Gaskill in his 
petition asks the court to make a determination as to the 
validity of the decree insofar as it provides for alimony. In 
this regard he raises the issue of whether Mrs. Gaskill has 
waived her claim for alimony, whether she should be estopped 
from claiming alimony, whether the decree should be modified 
nunc pro tunc such that it is consistent with the consent and 
waiver, and whether she is barred because of cohabitation from 
asserting the claim for alimony. If it becomes necessary to 
treat this last issue, an evidenciary hearing hearing will be 
necessary. 
WAIVER 
The elements of waiver were recently addressed in the case 
of Hinckley v. Hinckley, 167 Utah Adv. Rep 16. There the court 
said at page 17, citing Mont Trucking v. Entrada Indus., 802 
P.2d 779, (Utah App. 1990) (quoting Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 
1226, 1230 (Utah App. 1988): 
Waiver is "the intentional relinquishment of a known 
right." In order for waiver to occur, "there must be an 
existing right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its 
existence, and an intention to relinquish it." "The 
4 
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party's actions or conduct must evidence unequivocally an 
intent to waive, or must be inconsistent with any other 
intent.'1 "Whether a right has been waived is generally a 
question of *ct and therefore we accord considerable 
deference to the finder of fact's determination." 
For the purpose of this analysis it is required to assume 
the right of alimony exists. While in BO assuming for the 
purpose of argument, this defendant denies Mr. Gaskill's right 
to alimony does exist. 
It is absolutely clear that Mrs. Gaskill believed she had 
a right to claim alimony. In her affidavit dated 6 April, 
1978, she made that claim. 
It is also absolutely clear that her actions and conduct 
evidence unequivocally an intent to waive that claim. Her 
conduct is inconsistent with any other intent. Mrs. Gaskill 
retained an attorney, filed a petition and sought delinquent 
alimony in 1978. She knew, as the record shows, that Mr. 
Gaskill claimed he was not obligated to pay alimony. She knew 
there was a hearing on that subject. She knew she had the 
obligation of pursuing her claim for alimony. She did not 
reply to Mr. Gaskill's affidavit in 1978 in which he claimed he 
was not obligated to pay alimony. She did not comply with the 
court directive to go forward. It was her burden to do so. 
Her claim was dismissed. She did nothing about this claim for 
13 1/2 (thirteen and one-half) years. Her condi for 13 1/2 
years is completely consistent with an intent to waive 
5 
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alimony. It is totally inconsistent with any other intent. 
NUNC PRO TUNC 
Title 30-4a-l of the Utah Code, 1953 as amended, provides: 
A court having jurisdiction may, upon its finding of 
good cause and giving of such notice as may be ordered, 
enter an order nunc pro tunc in a matter relating to 
marriage, divorce, legal separation or annulment of 
marriage, (Emphasis added) 
This section of the Code has been addressed by the Utah 
Court of Appeals, Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057 (Utah App, 
1990) and the Utah Supreme Court, Home v. Home, 737 P.2d 244 
(Utah 1987). Both cases are helpful. 
In the Bagshaw case Mr. Bagshaw alleged that the parties 
and their attorneys made an oral agreement to terminate 
alimony. Mrs. Bagshaw denied that allegation. Mr. Bagshaw 
subsequently sought to enforce the oral agreement. The trial 
court found there was to be "no termination of alimony by 
reason of the actions of the plaintiff." (Mrs. Bagshaw). The 
court concluded there was no good cause. The court explained 
at page 1060 and following: 
The Home court held section 30-4a-l eliminated the 
common law nunc pro tunc requirement of a 
previously-entered final order and concluded that all that 
is required under the statute is a finding of "good 
cause." Id. The court stated that "[t]he meaning of 
'good cause1 must be determined on a case by case basis, 
in light of all of the surrounding circumstances, as 
6 
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equity and justice require." Id. at 248-49. 
While section 30-4a-l has a broad remedial scope, it 
does not abrogate all the common law trappings of nunc pro 
tunc law. At common law, nunc pro tunc allowed a court to 
correct its earlier error or supply its omission so the 
record accurately reflected that which in fact had taken 
place. Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 299 (Utah 1984); 
Home, 737 P.2d at 246. Cases in which courts 
traditionally have applied the nunc pro tunc doctrine fall 
into two categories: 
(1) those in which one of the parties died after 
the submission of the case to the lower court for its 
decision, but before the actual rendition of 
judgment; and (2) those in which a judgment has in 
fact been rendered by the lower court, but the clerk 
has failed to perform the ministerial function of 
entry.. 
6A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, paragraph 58.08 
(1989). 
The second category is based upon the principle that 
"where the delay in rendering judgment or decree arises 
from the act of the court, that is, where the delay has 
been for its convenience, or has been caused by the 
multiplicity or press of business or the intricacy of the 
questions involved, or of any other cause not attributable 
to the laches of the parties, but within the control of 
the court; the judgment or the decree may be entered 
retrospectively...." Mitchell v. Overman, 103 U.S. 62, 
64-65, 26 L.Ed. 369 (1881) (emphasis added); see also 6A 
J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice paragraph 58.08 (1989). 
These general principles of the common law of nunc pro 
tunc are relevant, if not controlling, in a determination 
of good cause under section 30-4a-l. In this case, the 
court did not make the clerical error, but taking the 
facts in the light most favorable to the Husband, Husband 
did. It is undisputed that the court never received the 
written stipulation mentioned in the minute entry. Thus, 
this alone could support a finding of lack of "good cause" 
under section 30-4a-l. 
Furthermore, a nunc pro tunc order must, even under the 
more liberal requirements of section 30-4a-l, still be 
entered for the purpose of making the record reflect what 
7 
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actually was meant to happen at a prior time. Thus, in 
determining good cause in our case, the threshold inquiry 
is (1) did Husband and Wife clearly agree that alimony 
would be terminated in 1973, and (2) was the court 
prepared in 1973 to enter an order based upon that 
agreement? The court found that "[t]he parties did not 
enter into any enforceable stipulation to modify the 
decree of divorce to terminate alimony by the defendant to 
the plaintiff," andff[t]here was no termination of alimony 
by reason of the actions of the plaintiff," Again, the 
court's findings support a conclusion that the "good 
cause" required for the entry of an order nunc pro tunc 
under section 30-4a-l was not present. 
There is good cause to modify the decree. Mr. Gaskill, a 
resident of California at the time, contracted to submit 
himself to the jurisdiction of the Utah Court and to have the 
court divide the assets, provided that he not be required to 
pay alimony. Because the alimony provision was included by the 
court, contrary to the express terms of the consent, the decree 
should be modified to provide now, as should have then, ie no 
alimony* 
ESTOPPLE 
The case of Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057 (Utah App. 
1990) is helpful. It lays out, at page 1061, the elements of 
estoppel. There the court said: 
In order to prevail on his theory of estoppel, 
plaintiff must prove that defendant, by her 
representations or actions led plaintiff to believe he 
need not pay alimony or child support, and that plaintiff, 
in reliance on said representations, changed his position 
to his detriment. In such a case, enforcement of the 
8 
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decree creates a hardship and injustice to plaintiff, and 
defendant would be estopped to deny her own 
misrepresentations, and estopped from claiming unpaid 
support. 
Mrs. Gaskill filed an affidavit seeking delinquent alimony 
in April, 1978• Since that date she has done nothing. Her 
actions are clear. Her claim, which she had the burden 
pursuing, was abandoned. Mr. Gaskill went on with his life 
until August of 1991 when he was confronted with a claim for 
many tens of thousands of dollars. Clearly, to award such a 
claim against him would create an undue hardship and an 
injustice. 
COHABITATION 
The claim of cohabitation cannot be resolved by this 
memorandum. In the event the court rules in favor of Mrs. 
Gaskill on the other issues, then an evidentiary hearing will 
be required to determine if she has cohabited with someone else. 
Dated and signed this day of January, 1992. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the ^ f day of January, 1992, I 
hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Memorandum in Support of Petition to Modify Decree, to Helen 
Christian, Attorney for Plaintiff* 
<U4*tWljt> A 
BRENT D. YOUNC 
gaskill/2.12/3 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH £? 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, j 
vs. \ 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 76492?691 DA 
COMMISSIONER: >f* ?: 
MICHAEL S.5EVANS ' 
..»••; •..• • • • • •• " 
; .;-.•-^ . ^ , X.. --•_,-; 
. • # • 
& • • • • * . * • • ; ; - . . . . . r . 
;,£*:• '" •••• *•' •>'• 
This matter comes on for hearing- pursuantf to [defendant's 
Motion for an Order to Show Cause and Petition to-Modify the 
Decree of Divorce and plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment• 
At hearing before the Commissioner, Counsel stipulated that the 
disputed issues are issues at law and that the Commissioner 
- *\ 
could address the issues identified following the submission of 
further memorandum from Counsel* Counsel further stipulated 
that discovery could continue beyond the ^  date >: of :? the 
Commissioner's recommendation and that entryr ofy an") order 
resulting from the Commissioner's recommendation be stayed for 
ten (10) days or such further time period in ,,the event of a 
timely objection, _ ; ;v«£ \ 
,;'••'•' „J. '••''1'' ." •.'•'* 
Counsel stipulate to—submit the following questions of law 
-
: •'.•••.-.• * - . . & . 
- . * ' • • • • : • • - • ' , ' t . • • ; • • : • * 
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for the Commissioner's recommendation: ' | 
'.;•: '. • n 
Whether the Decree of Divorce is valid; ^ ^ 
Whether the Decree of Divorce should be modified or amended 
nunc pro tunc; ^ 0 f;.•••. f 
Whether plaintiff's claim for judgment is barred or limited 
because of waiver, estoppel or statute of limitations; 5, 
Whether plaintiff's claim for alimony is barred by way of 
operation of law as a result of her alleged cohabitation; and | 
Whether judgment should enter in favor of plaintiff and, if 
so, for what time period. r-<v $ ^ 
The undisputed facts reveal that the parties together have 
created a most perplexing circumstance. Following twenty (25) 
years of marriage and the rearing of four. (4)
 t children, 
plaintiff was awarded a Decree of Divorce pursuant to 
defendant's default based upon a "Consent and Waiver" to which 
defendant had interlineated "omit number 8 on complaint." 
Paragraph 8 of plaintiff's complaint provides "that the 
defendant pay the plaintiff $700.00 per month alimony for a 
period of thirty (30) months, after which time the defendant has 
agreed to pay the plaintiff $450.00 per month for the reaminder 
of her life, providing, however, that should plaintiff remarry 
all alimony payments shall cease forthwith." 
At hearing on plaintiff's complaint, the Court's Minute 
Entry reflects "Divorce-granted to plaintiff as prayed, except 
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GASKILL V, GASKILL * -|PAGE ^f'f ^"^^^l^lJT^m^Y 
plaintiff is awarded $450.00 per month alimony." % % ?- § 
In October, 1978, plaintiff brought her Order to Show Cause 
seeking a judgment for unpaid alimony. The Court's Minute Entry 
reflects that hearing on plaintiff's Order to Show Cause was 
continued at the request of defendant's Counsel,^ Defendant then 
filed his Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce seeking nunc pro 
tunc amendment awarding no alimony* Following argument, the 
• V ." . 1 * •••• 
Court directed both counsel to submit memoranda,T When none were 
received, the Court ruled by way of Minute Entry that "The 
Petition is denied without prejudice." The Commissioner 
clarifies the Court's Minute Entry in this regard to indicate 
that both plaintiff's Order to Show Cause was denied and 
defendant's Motion to Amend was dismissed without prejudice, £ 
Neither party took any further legal action ; ,arding these 
issues until recently when plaintiff sought entry of a judgment 
for failure to pay alimony in the State of Washington' where 
defendant presently resides. It is undisputed"that defendant 
has paid no alimony. The parties dispute whether plaintiff has 
requested payments directly from the defendant. 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: •* 
Plaintiff's claim for judgment^ for alimony due, ~ ?ing but 
unpaid is limited pursuant to U.C.A. 78-12-22 to reco\ ^ng only 
those sums due, owing but unpaid accruing eight ^ (8) years prior 
to plaintiff's motion ^to-enforce the Decree seeking judgment. 
J* V - z 
-?v. •'•> > 
- V; " '•}£':. -\, '•:: 
i ;' . • 'y :V-[<.**' -.gf "* v .-•" $ 
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**' ^•'
v
'% 't - F i 
said positions at any point subsequent to 1978/ and both parties 
assert that same circumstance result in the others' waiving any 
claim for relief. In not pursuing her claim for relief/ 
plaintiff ran the risk that her recovery would be limited, as it 
has been, by operation of the applicable statute of 
limitations. Conversly, defendant's awareness of a prima facia 
valid order of the Court requiring his payment/of alimony and 
his failure to prosecute his Motion to Amend said Decree created 
the risk that the order would be enforced against the 
defendant. Of the two, defendant had at least equal incentive 
to prosecute to completion the relief he sought in his 1978 
pleading. Under the present circumstances, it ^  would be 
inequitable to find that either party is estopped from asserting 
their respective positions or that they have waived the same, '* 
VALIDITY OF DECREE: } y ;*J. ^ i ? 
While it is clear there was no complete meeting of the minds 
reflected by the Consent and Waiver.defendant returned and which 
was the basis of entering defendant's default and awarding 
plaintiff a Decree of Divorce, is equally clear that defendant's 
failure to prosecute his-Motion to Amend filed in 1978 deprived 
WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL: I • ,i-
Both parties claim the other should be. estopped from {/% 
asserting his or her position as a result of failure! to resolve r %^'Jf 
the actions initiated in October, 1978 and failure* to pursue 
3 
. * • • • • • 
\y/$ .3
 ;/. ' ^ - § •'* $•; 
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the Court of any reasonable opportunity to set aside the initial 
* -••' h - ~ - '• $& - i :' 
alimony award and to take evidence as to what, .if any/ alimony 'I; 
award would be appropriate. It would be diffi ult, if not ~ ' ';' 
impossible, to actually determine an appropriate nony ward -i 
in light of the parties circumstances in 1976, ; In this r<~~jard# V ; 
the Commissioner notes that at the time of ~t:he -divorce the r ; 
parties had been married for twenty-five (25) years/|had reared ' 
- •,:"..- • ' • & $ • • ••.; - ^ > . • * 
four (4) children and there appeared to a substantial disparity > :• / 
in the part es income, a! of which factors are consistent with *' *; 
an award of permanent al )ny in a substantial/amount, /It sis : 
not necessary to decide wrather defendant should be ^ entitled to ?, -v>* 
relief from operation of the Decree of Divorce in/regard to 
alimony between the time of it's entry in 1976 and the time 
defendant became aware of the order as plaintiff's ability to 
recover is limited to the eight (8) year period preceeding the 
initiation of her action to recover* ;^  •/ % 
COHABITATION: /*•/< ; > 
Defendant argues that at some point since the entry of 
Decree in 1976/ plaintiff cohabitated in a fashion so as to 
allow the Court to terminate the alimony award. The plaintiff 
denies such cohabitatior The Commissioner agrees with the 
position as set forth in plaintiff's Memorandum and recommends 
that the alimony award not be terminated /as a^result of * 
. ' .. ? — .^ ft •:• :-.:-;- % : r 
plaintiff's alleged cohabitation. - "- % 
' - • > f : ' • • • - ' ^ 7- :. I V -
: ':-...- ; • '• . ' ' • £ . " : • .-• * ' \ 
» * '''.'. ••' .'•
 ;
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* 
MODIFICATION: | 
Defendant seeks, in the alternative, an order modifying the 
Decree of Divorce terminating defendant's obligation to pay 
• * -$s v . . ,; 
alimony to plaintiff. In this regard defendant has failed to 
allege, and the Commissioner cannot find, a substantial change 
of circumstances has occured material to the issue of alimony. 
Consequently, the Commissioner recommends the Decree
 ;of Divorce 
not be modified. \; •''£; / 
RECOMMENDATION: & . '-£: '': ^ 
> . ; * ' • • • * ; • • • , . ' 
1. Defendant's Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro 
Tunc, or in the Alternative, to Modify the Decree of Divorce be 
denied. \ l[\ % % ";;. .. v: 
2. Plaintiff be awarded judgment againstl defendant for 
. • % ' ; - : # • • 
alimony due, owing but unpaid in the sum of $450.00 per month 
for the time period commencing eight (8) years next
 rpreceeding 
the filing of plaintiff's Motion for Judgment and continuing to 
the present time. 
3. Implementation of the Commissioner's Recommendation be 
stayed for a period of ten (10) days, or longer in the event of 
; A "X- 'r '"••-" f 
filing of a timely objection. *£ ~? 
4. Plaintiff's Counsel is to prepare an order, consistent 
with this recommendation. ' % &' v 
DATED this day of June, 1992. 
MICHAEL S. EVANS 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a tr 
the foregoing MINUTE ENTRY, postage prepaid, to the/* following, 
and correct^ copy pf 
«-; 
this i^  day of June, 1992: 
Helen E, Christian 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Brent D. Young 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorney for Defendant 
P. 0. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
V -;:¥ 
H ;• .-*tf 
''' ••£-;•* 
•V«-
• " v*'-
•*C 
" * ^ • 
v- '• * £ 
-. ' '" •' ' '" :£ ' 
"
T
 '- '^"t 
.;•;§..• 
ii '•j&£*85 
• — • ' « . . 
• • : . * # # > 
•'-SJS? 
* * • * • > .• 
'.'^>--
. V ^ J 
v *m 
"•'^' 
• • '^ 
; • ; * » • . 
SF$&'. 
••••'••''fan** 
• . * " , . - . ^ i ' . 
•;•; v ' 
.*. 
£ 
* § \ • -•''• 
?*" '•• • 
* * • ' • • . 
W-
:
'vv--V" 
ft 
I 
1 
t 
i 
it! 
CUc 61 Is 
I^A-^ JL £u 
'ft' 
^ ^ J ^ ' • 1 
'?7 
y* 
****** 
% 
i 
".* 
ii 
5% 
•vi& 
# • 
>$.' 
. & • ; : 
• . • " ' ' 
V 
. & ' • 
^
v
-
' r -
" »:]•«• 
• ^ ; : . " T 
• - ' l ^ s 
- V--W 
- • " ^ 
* /" •**"' 
••^ ..'' 
- v * 
• o;fEL 
*v 
I Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
*
 f , L £ D 
DISTRICT COURT 
JMtt 8 IMAM'S? 
BRENT D. YOUNG (3584) rHiiil~. „.. ..,,, „ 
IVIE & YOUNG ^ r E / o S , C T 
Attorneys for Defendant |y ^ ^ * 
48 North University Avenue ^ ^ DEPUTY CLEliF 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: 375-3000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, 
OBJECTION TO RECOMMENDATION 
AND REQUEST FOR HEARING 
BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT 
Case No. 764923691 DA 
Commissioner: Michael S. Evans 
vs. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
The defendant objects to the Commissioner Recommendation, 
paragraphs 1 and 2 (Page 6). Defendant's objection 
incorporates his Memorandum which was earlier filed. It is the 
defendant's position, that in addition to the arguments set 
forth in his Memorandum, that the burden to pursue the alimony 
claim was on the plaintiff, and not upon the defendant as the 
Commissioner's decision implies. It is the defendant's 
position that the plaintiff knew in 1978 of the defendant's 
objection to the alimony award, that he resisted at that time 
her claim for alimony, and that the plaintiff did nothing until 
she recently sought to obtain a judgment in a foreign 
jurisdiction. 
Defendant requests hearing of this matter in the District 
fmnna/t 
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Court. 
Dated and signed this / ' day of June, 1992. 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this /f day of June, 1992, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection to 
Commissioner's Recommendation, to Helen Christian, Attorney for 
Plaintiff, by placing it in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Helen Christian 
Attorney at Law 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
AlL^T/^/* 
BRENT D . YOU) JJtfG 
/&<+rZ' 
2 
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County of Salt Lake - State of Utah 
T I T L E : (*> PARTIES PRESENT) COUNSEL: (•* COUNSEL PRESENT) 
1/ 
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CLERK HON. 
REPORTER DATE ; _ ^ 2 W l 
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"Z 
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FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247) / i p . ^ ' ; v A ^ / J W \ 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN L^^&J&teAUilH /) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff
 BY .._ 
Suite 722 Boston Building ' u'..i'un CLERK 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone; (801) 531-7444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL a/k/a 
LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
OBJECTION 
Civil No. 764923691 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
ooOoo 
Plaintiff, LEA GASKILL, by and through her attorney of record, 
Helen E. Christian, hereby files this response in opposition to 
Defendant's Objection to the Recommendation of the Commissioner and 
asks the Court to affirm the Recommendation in all its particulars. 
Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Objection is based upon 
the following grounds and for the following reasons: 
Defendant incorrectly asserts -hat it was Plaintiff's burden 
to pursue her right to alimony, and not his burden to correct an 
Order of this Court that he now claims should not have been 
entered. Defendant's argument fails for two reasons: In the first 
place, Defendant was aware of his obligation to pay alimony, as 
this matter had been brought before the Court subsequent to entry 
i 
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of the Decree, and he failed to take whatever legal action was 
necessary to rectify what he now alleges was an improperly entered 
Order, Therefore, Defendant is estopped from asking for relief 
from that obligation. Second, Defendants failure to pay alimony to 
Plaintiff prohibited Plaintiff from obtaining the legal services 
required to collect the alimony owing to her. Defendant failed to 
pay alimony to Plaintiff for years and now claims that because she 
did not pursue him to collect arrearages, she should not be 
entitled to judgment for the arrearages owing. Such a conclusion 
would penalize Plaintiff for circumstances Defendant himself 
created and would be unreasonable and unfair. 
Defendant's defenses to his failure to pay alimony and the 
Court's reasons for disallowing them were sufficiently addressed in 
the Commissioner's Memorandum Decision, a copy of which is attached 
to this Response and incorporated herein by reference. Counsel for 
the Defendant filed numerous pleadings and presented oral arguments 
before the Commissioner. The Commissioner allowed counsel for both 
parties to submit additional Information prior to making his 
determination on the merits of their motions. 
No additional information would be presented to the Court at 
a hearing on this matter, other than that which has been 
introduced, and Plaintiff respectfully represents to the Court that 
she cannot afford to incur further expense for another hearing in 
order to obtain Defendant's compliance with his alimony obligation. 
2 
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to affirm the 
recommendations of the Commissioner. z 
DATED this [ day of July, 1992. 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION, by placing same in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid, on this ^' day of July, 1992, addressed to: 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
- % 
Kay J. Srahtasky 
gaakill.2rea 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 764923691 DA 
COMMISSIONER: 
MICHAEL S. EVANS 
This matter comes on for hearing pursuant to defendants 
Motion for an Order to Show Cause and Petition to Modify the 
Decree of Divorce and plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Judgment. 
At hearing before the Commissioner, Counsel stipulated that the 
disputed issues are issues at law and that the Commissioner 
could address the issues identified following the submission of 
further memorandum from Counsel. Counsel further stipulated 
that discovery could continue beyond the date of the 
Commissioners recommendation and that entry of an order 
resulting from the Commissioners recommendation be stayed for 
ten (10) days or such further time period in the event of a 
timely objection. 
Counsel stipulate to submit the following questions of law 
nnnnQQ 
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GASKILL V. GASKILL PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
for the Commissioner's recommendation: 
Whether the Decree of Divorce is valid; 
Whether the Decree of Divorce should be modified or amended 
nunc pro tunc; 
Whether plaintiff's claim for judgment is barred or limited 
because of waiver, estoppel or statute of limitations; 
Whether plaintiff's claim for alimony is barred by way of 
operation of law as a result of her alleged cohabitation; and 
Whether judgment should enter in favor of plaintiff and, if 
so, for what time period. 
The undisputed facts reveal that the parties together have 
created a most perplexing circumstance. Following twenty (25} 
years of marriage and the rearing of four (4) children, 
plaintiff was awarded a Decree of Divorce pursuant to 
defendant's default based upon a "Consent and Waiver11 to which 
defendant had interlineated "omit number 8 on complaint." 
Paragraph 8 of plaintiff's complaint provides "that the 
defendant pay the plaintiff $700.00 per month alimony for a 
period of thirty (30) months, after which time the defendant has 
agreed to pay the plaintiff $450.00 per month for the reaminder 
of her life, providing, however, that should plaintiff remarry 
all alimony payments shall cease forthwith." 
At heai ng on plaintiff's complaint, the Court's Minute 
Entry reflects "Divorce granted to plaintiff as prayed, except 
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GASKILL V. GASKILL PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY • 
plaintiff is awarded $450.00 per month alimony." 
In October, 1978, plaintiff brought her Order to Show Cause 
seeking a judgment for unpaid alimony. The Court's Minute Entry 
reflects that hearing on plaintiff's Order to Show Cause was 
continued at the request of defendant's Counsel. Defendant then 
filed his Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce seeking nunc pro 
tunc amendment awarding no alimony. Following argument, the 
Court directed both counsel to submit memoranda. When none were 
received, the Court ruled by way of Minute Entry that "The 
Petition is denied without prejudice." The Commissioner 
clarifies the Court's Minute Entry in this regard to indicate 
that both plaintiff's Order to Show Cause was denied and 
defendant's Motion to Amend was dismissed without prejudice. 
Neither party took any further legal action regarding these 
issues until recently when plaintiff sought entry of a judgment 
for failure to pay alimony in the State of Washington where 
defendant presently resides. It is undisputed that defendant 
has paid no alimony. The parties dispute whether plaintiff has 
requested payments directly from the defendant. 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: 
Plaintiff's claim for judgment for alimony due# owing but 
unpaid is limited pursuant to U.C.A. 78-12-22 to recovering only 
those sums due, owing but unpaid accruing eight (8) years prior 
to plaintiff's motion ^o enforce the Decree seeking judgment. 
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GASKILL V, GASKILL PAGE 4 MINUTE ENTRY 
WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL: 
Both parties claim the other should be estopped from 
asserting his or her position as a result of failure to resolve 
•the actions initiated in October, 1978 and failure to pursue 
said positions at any point subsequent to 1978, and both parties 
assert that same circumstance result in the others' waiving any 
claim for relief. In not pursuing her claim for relief, 
plaintiff ran the risk that her recovery would be limited, as it 
has been, by operation of the u applicable statute of 
limitations. Conversly, defendant's awareness of a prima facia 
valid order of the Court requiring his payment of alimony and 
his failure to prosecute his Motion to Amend said Decree created 
the risk that the order would be enforced against the 
defendant. Of the two, defendant had at least equal incentive 
to prosecute to completion the relief he sought in his 1978 
pleading. Under the present circumstances, it would be 
inequitable to find that either party is estopped from asserting 
their respective positions or that they have waived the same. 
VALIDITY OF DECREE: 
While it is clear there was no complete meeting of the minds 
reflected by the Consent and Waiver defendant returned and which 
was the basis of entering defendant's default and awarding 
plaintiff a Decree of Divorce, is equally clear that defendant's 
failure to prosecute his Motion to Amend filed in 1978 deprived 
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GASKILL V. GASKILL PAGE 5 MINUTE ENTRY 
the Court of any reasonable opportunity to set aside the initial 
alimony award and to take evidence as to what, if any, alimony 
award would be appropriate. It would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to actually determine an appropriate alimony award 
in light of the parties circumstances in 1976. In this regard, 
the Commissioner notes that at the time of the divorce the 
parties had been married for twenty-five (25) years, had reared 
four (4) children and there appeared to a substantial disparity 
in the parties income, all of which factors are consistent with 
an award of permanent alimony in a substantial amount. It is 
not necessary to decide whether defendant should be entitled to 
relief from operation of the Decree of Divorce in regard to 
alimony between the time of it's entry in 1976 and the time 
defendant became aware of the order as plaintiff's ability to 
recover is limited to the eight (8) year period preceeding the 
initiation of her action to recover. 
COHABITATION; 
Defendant argues that at some point since the entry of 
Decree in 1976, plaintiff cohabitated in a fashion so as to 
allow the Court to terminate the alimony award. The plaintiff' 
denies such cohabitation. The Commissioner agrees with the 
position as set forth in plaintiff's Memorandum and recommends 
that the alimony award not be terminated as a result of 
plaintiff's alleged cohabitation. 
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GASKILL V. GASKILL PAGE 6 MINUTE ENTRY 
MODIFICATION: 
Defendant seeks, in the alternative, an order modifying the 
Decree of Divorce terminating defendant's obligation to pay 
alimony to plaintiff. In this regard defendant has failed to 
allege, and the Commissioner cannot find, a substant change 
of circumstances has occured material to the issue o. alimony. 
Consequently, the Commissioner recommends th Decree of Divorce 
not be modified. 
RECOMMENDATION: 
1. D^, dant's Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro 
Tunc, or in the Alternative, to Modify the Decree of Divorce be 
denied. 
2. Plaintiff be awarded judgment against defendant for 
alimony due, owing but unpaid in the sum of $450.00 per month 
for the t e perio 1 commencing eight (8) years next preceeding 
the filing f pla tiff's Motion for Judgment and continuing to 
the present time. 
3. Implementation of the Commissioner's Recommendation be 
stayed for a period of ten (10) days, or longer in the event of 
filing of a timely objection. 
4. Plaintiff's Counsel is to prepare an order consistent 
with this recommendation. 
DATED this day of June, 1992. 
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GASKILL V. GASKILL PAGE 6 MINUTE ENTRY 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing MINUTE ENTRY, postage prepaid, to the following, 
this /JJ- day of June, 1992: 
Helen E. Christian 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Brent D. Young 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorney for Defendant 
P. O. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
HL£H 
JUL I 4 54 PH '» 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247) ^^ oi^TRIC 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Suite 722 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
:n\ 
ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL a/k/a 
LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR 
DECISION AND REQUEST 
FOR RULING 
Civil No. 764923691 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
ooOoo 
Plaintiff, LEA GASKILL, by and through her attorney of record, 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN, pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, respectfully requests a ruling on Defendant's 
Objection to Recommendation which was filed on or about June 17, 
1992. Plaintiff hereby certifies that the time allowed by the 
rules for the filing of memoranda in support and/or in opposition 
to the Motion has passed. 
DATED this y" day of July, 1992. 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION AND 
REQUEST FOR RULING by placing same in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid, on this J _^ d aY o f July/ 1992, addressed to: 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorney3 for Defendant 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
Kay J. Slaht'asky 
gaskill.nsub 
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F1L£D 
DlSTRlCf COURT 
BRENT D. YOUNG (3584) x l A DU •QV 
IVIE & YOUNG JUL L H 58 IH j£ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff nmTRid 
48 North University Avenue SMV'UV'--' COUNTY 
P.O. Box 672 BY J ^ " 
Provo, UT 84603 ofpUTY CLERK 
Telephone: 375-3000 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
\ 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
CERTIFICATE OF 
READINESS FOR TRIAL 
Civil No. 764923691 
Commissioner Evans 
It is hereby requested that the above-entitled case be set for 
(check on^f: 
y
 ' NONJURY TRIAL 
JURY TRIAL, for which the jury fee of $ is enclosed 
herewith. 
Copies of this request have been furnished to the following: 
Helen E. Christian 
Attorney at Law 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Within the purview of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and Rule 4.1, Rules of Practice in the District 
Courts, the undersigned certifies that the case is at issue and 
ready for trial. 
Dated: June ^ y , 1992. ^-> 
BRENT D . YCJUN^f 
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In the District Court of the Third Judicial District 
In and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL 
Plaintiff 
vs. \ Notice of Pre-Trial 
Settlement Hearing 
DON R GASKILL | civil No. 764923691 
Defendant 
The court has set a pre-trial settlement hearing on this case as follows: 
SHtfge: COm MICHAEL S EVANS 
Date: August 11. 1992 
Time: 10:00 am 
C i r c u i t Courtroom 340 
Counsel as well as both clients are to be present so that if settlement is reached, the divorce may be granted at this hearing. 
If the domestic calendar clerk has not heard from you within five (5) days from the date of this notice, this hearing date 
will be considered firm; and upon failure to appear, default will be entered. 
Counsel are required to submit to the domestic calendar clerk a written settlement proposal Ave (5) days prior to the 
pre-trial settlement hearing and to opposing counsel. 
The Financial Declaration forms for both plaintiff and defendant must be filed with the domestic calendar clerk at 
least five (5) days prior to pre-trial settlement hearing. Failure of counsel to supply the required financial information 
may result in the matter being stricken. If only one party responds, then that party's statement will be deemed as true, and 
the court may enter its order accordingly. 
In the event a matter is stricken, the court will notify both counsel and their clients as to the reasons therefor. 
If settlement is reached prior to hearing, then the court at the time of the pre-trial settlement hearing may grant the 
divorce requested on a proper showing as though a default matter. 
Both counsel are required to follow Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in providing the address of their clients to the 
court and to each other at the time of the filing of Complaint; and if not done so, on receipt of this document. 
Copies of this notice were mailed to the following attorneys and/or parties at the addresses indicated: 
BRENT D YOUNG, 48 N University Ave, PO BOX 672, Provo, Ut 84603 
HELEN E CHRISTIAN, //3rd Fl-N Y BLDG, 48 Post Office PI, SLC, UT 841C 
Dated this 6£h day of J"lv 19 92 
\ J U i f t j A Vffl/vA, 
District Judge 
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GASKILL, ALBERTA FANNEY 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
GASKILL, DON R 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY % 
CASE NUMBER 764923691 DA 
DATE 07/20/92r 
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK STH v' 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. 
D. ATTY. 
• / • • • • - • 
* 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR RULING HAVING BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE 
COURT PURSUANT TO RULE 4-501. JOMES NOW THE COURT AND STATES AS 
FOLLOWS: COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATIONS ARE AFFIRMED - NO ORAL 
ARGUMENT NECESSARY. V : 
CC: HELEN E. CHRISTIAN " A ,W' " 
BRENT D. YOUNG - •". % ^ 
i 
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#'d ^0 6 1 t 1992 HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247) 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Suite 722 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
I'liiity Olork 
ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL a/k/a 
LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF CONTINUANCE OF 
PRE-TRIAL SETTLEMENT 
CONFERENCE WITHOUT DATE 
Civil No. 764923691 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
-ooOoo-
TO: Defendant, DON R. GASKILL, and his attorney of record, 
BRENT D. YOUNG. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the PRE-TRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE 
originally scheduled for August 11, 1992, has been continued 
without date as agreed upon by both counsels of record. 
DATED this day of August, 1992. 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
nnnm 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF CONTINUANCE OF PRE-TRIAL SETTLEMENT 
CONFERENCE WITHOUT DATE, by placing same in the United States mail# 
postage prepaid, on this^n\ day of August, 1992, addressed to: 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
gaskill.ncon 
2 
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J^aiEiENiT KU$ BURBOT ftmivr 
Third Judicial District 
AUG 2 8 1992 
LTLAKt COUNTY SA e  
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247) 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Suite 722 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
OOOOO — 
DtiAiiy ClOiK 
ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL a/k/a 
LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
O R D E R 
Civil No. 764923691 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
ooOoo 
This matter having come before the Court on Defendant's 
Objection to the Recommendations of Commissioner Evans entered in 
his Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 1992, and the court having 
reviewed the file and the pleadings contained therein, and the 
court having denied Defendant's request for hearing and Plaintiff 
having submitted a Request for Ruling, pursuant to Rule 4-502, Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration, and the Court having entered its 
Minute Entry dated July 20, 1992, wherein the Court affirmed the 
recommendations of the Commissioner, and good cause appearing 
therefore, the Court now m^kes and enters the following Order: 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED: 
1. Defendant's request for hearing is denied, the Court 
finding that no oral argument is necessary. 
n n n 11 Q 
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2. Defendant's objection to the recommendations of the 
Commissioner be and is hereby denied, and the recommendations are 
affirmed. 
3. The Court incorporates the Findings and Recommended Order 
of the Commissioner and adopts the same as its own and incorporates 
the same by reference herein. 
4. Defendant's Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro 
Tunc, or in the Alternative, to Modify the Decree of Divorce, is 
denied. 
5. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendant for 
alimony due, owing but unpaid in the sum of $450.00 per month for 
the time period commencing eight (8) years next preceding the 
filing of Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment and continuing to the 
present time, which amount is the amount of $81, 239.36, 
representing alimony arrearages, including interest, from January 
1, 1984 up through and including June 30, 1992. 
DATED this 3$ day of Ud^yu**^ 1992. 
JAM^S. SAWAYA \ ' 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BRENT D. YOUNG Date 
Attorney for Defendant 
o n n n 11 A 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER by placing same in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid, on thisc^^A day of July, 1992, addressed 
to: 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
Kay J^  Slahfc^ sky 
gaskill.2ror 
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HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247) 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Suite 722 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL a/k/a 
LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR 
DECISION AND REQUEST 
FOR RULING 
Civil No. 764923691 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
ooOoo 
Plaintiff, LEA GASKILL, by and through her attorney of record, 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN, pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, respectfully requests a ruling "on t a issue of 
attorney's fees, which was reserved by the Commissioner and 
presented to the Court by way of Affidavits". 
DATED this day of August, 1992. 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION AND 
REQUEST FOR RULING by placing same in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid, on this ~M day of .July, 1992, addressed to: 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
Kay J.^Ulahtasfcj 
ga8klll.2naub 
2 
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BRENT D. YOUNG (3584) 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
FILED 
fl'STRlcr COURT 
SEP 2 JO 27 m '31 
BY -II.i^i +/K .••'.-, 
48 North University Avenue !'-<'-.iU CLERK 
* P.O. Box 672 
> Provo, UT 84603 
^ >^ Telephone: 375-3000 
^ <> IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
>s. <i SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
J^  ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL aka 
LEE OR LEA GASKILL, 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 764923691 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
TO THE PLAINTIFF: ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILL by and through her 
attorney, Helen E. Christian: 
Helen E. Christian 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
Suite 722 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111 
Notice is hereby given that the defendant and appellant, DON 
R. GASKILL, by and through his counsel, Brent D. Young, appeals to 
the Utah Court of Appeals of the State of Utah from that final Order 
of the Hon. James S. Sawaya, entered in this matter on 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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August 28, 1992. 
The appeal is taken from the entire judgment. 
Dated: September /o , 19^ 
BRENT D. YOyUGU 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing notice to Helen E. Christian, Attorney for Plaintiff, by 
placing it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, addressed as 
follows: 
Helen E. Christian 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
Suite 722 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111>/^~) 
BRENT D. YOliNC 
scnotapp/9.1 
nnoii9 
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BRENT D. YOUNG (3584) 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: 375-3000 
»ISTR!0r COURT 
toJS IB n AH'» 
j^^C WW? -><^- y 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL aka 
LEE OR LEA GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, 
COST BOND ON APPEAL 
vs. ) Civil No. 764923691 
.DON R. GASKILL, ) Judge: James S. Sawaya 
Defendant. 
Defendant, Don R. Gaskill, in the above-entitled action is 
appealing to the Utah Court of Appeals from a decision made and 
entered in the above-entitled matter in favor of the defendant. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, we, the 
undersigned, MARGIE ROBBINS and KIMBERLY FIELDING, do hereby 
undertake and promise on the part of the appellant and acknowledge 
ourselves bound in the sum of $300.00 conditioned to secure the 
payment of costs if the appeal is dismissed or the judgment is 
modified, and not exceeding the sum of $300.00, and the said MARGIE 
ROBBINS and KIMBERLY FIELDING hereby submit themselves to the 
jurisdiction of the above-court and irrevocably appoint the clerk of 
o. n A1 on 
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said court as their agent upon whom any papers affecting their 
liability on this bond may be served and further agree that their 
liability may be enforced on motion without the necessity of an 
independent action. 
jry
 1992. Dated: September 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Utah ) ss. 
MARGIE ROBBINS and KIMBERLY FIELDING, the sureties whose names 
are subscribed to the above undertaking, being severally and duly 
sworn, each for themselves, say: That they are a resident and 
freeholder in the State and County and are worth the sum in said 
undertaking specified as a penalty thereof over and above all their 
just debts and liabilities and exclusive of property exempt from 
execution. 
Dated: September & 1992. 
MARGIE//ROBBINS 
TCIftBERLY FIELDING 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this y day of September, 1992, 
NOTARY PUBLtC fl 
bond/9.1 wmnauc MERLE Y.NYMAN 
746 WM 700 South 
fan, UUt 84058 
My Comm. Expire 8-2044 
Sate of Utah 
2 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the / 0 day of September, 1992, I 
caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Cost 
Bond on Appeal, to Helen Christian, Attorney for Plaintiff, by 
placing a copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed as follows: 
Helen Christian 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 722 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
^S&L-//7 
BRENT 
3 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GASKILL, ALBERTA FANNEY 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
GASKILL, DON R 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY I 
CASE NUMBER 764923691 DA 
DATE 09/29/92 
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK STH 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. 
D. ATTY. 
•"•%' 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES HAVING BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE COURT PURSUANT TO RULE 4-501, 
COMES NOW THE COURT AND STATES AS FOLLOWS: I FIND NO >' 
RESERVATION OF THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEY FEES, NO ANY AFFIDAVITS, 
CC: HELEN E. CHRISTIAN 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
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ssell VV. Bench 
idii}}! Judge 
luh M. Billings 
•ciiiu- 1'icsiding Judge 
i^nal VV. Garff 
nela T. Greenwood 
c 
rmau H. Jackson 
:c 
rgory K. Orme 
e 
>nani H. Russon 
©taf) Court of appeals 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Clerks'Office 801-578-3950 
Administration 801-578-3900 
Fax 801-578-5999 
October 2, 1992 
Brent D. Young 
Ivie & Young 
Attorneys at Law 
48 North University Avenue 
P. O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
In Re: 
Alberta Fannie Gaskill aka Lee 
or Lea Gaskill, 
Plaintiff and Appel"*e, 
v. 
Don R. Gaskill, 
Defendant and Appel nt. 
Dear Mr. Young: 
«L£aSJSTHjeT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
OCT 0 5 1992 
C-.'PuyCl 
Mary T. Noonan 
Clerk ot the Court 
Case No. 920632-CA 
f
^y 
Please be advised t*at the notice of appeal in this case has 
been filed with the Court of Appeals on October 1, 1992. The case 
number is 920632-CA and should be indicated on any future filings. 
Within ten days of the filing of the Notice of Appeal, Rule 
11(e)(1) requires the appellant request from the reporter a 
transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as 
the appellant deems necessary. The request must be in writing and 
directed to the court reporter by name. You must make make 
satisfactory arrangements for payment, and file a certificate to 
that effect with the clerk of the court from which the appeal is 
taken and a copy with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. Please 
be aware that a "no name" request for transcript may sit 
indefinitely without being delivered to the reporter. If no such 
parts of the proceedings are to be requested, within the same 
period the appellant must file a certificate to that effect wit4 
the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken and a cop 
witn the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. If there is no transcr ,; 
request, the clerk shall transmit the index of the record within 
20 days, but not sooner than 14 days, after the filing of the 
notice of appeal. 
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Case No, 920632-CA 
October 2, 1992 
Page -2-
The Docketing Statement, consisting of the original and three 
copies, is due within 21 days of the filing of the notice of 
appeal in the trial court, or October 16, 1992, 
Sincerely, 
^ ' • 
. • / • 
Janice Ray i 
Deputy Clerk 
-^' 
cc: Helen E. Christian 
•/Third District, Salt Lake County #764923 691 before 
The Honorable James S. Sawaya 
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OCT 13 3 ss PH'B Oti H 4 " ?H ' f i 
v.,=.TRlCT 
H E L E N E . C H R I S T I A N (2247) jiii (Vf.tlCT Th'r. '•-:\VY 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN '•• ••-"\ V ^ M N T Y bv-- ^ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff BY "~^i^-£&.__-—BX - ,'. ,';< CLERK 
Suite 722 Boston Building i"'L™ 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7^44 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL a/k/a 
LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DON R. GASKTLL, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR ORDER IN RE: 
SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS 
Civil No. 764923631 
Judge James S. Sciwaya 
ooOoo 
Plaintiff, by and through her counsel of record, Helen E. 
Christian, moves the above-entitled Court for an Order requiring 
the Defendant, DON R. GASKILL, to appear before this Court to 
answer concerning Defendant's property. This Motion is based upon 
the files and records in the above-entitled case, which show that 
on the 28th day of August, 1992, Plaintiff recovered judgment 
against said Defendant for the sum of $81,239.06, plus interest 
until paid, and this Judgment has not been paid and all of the same 
is owing at this time. 
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.f* 
DATED this \ 5 daY o f October, 1992. 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
HELEN E. "ettRTSTIAlK/ 
Attorney for Plaintiri^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR ORDER IN RE: SUPPLEMENTAL 
PROCEEDINGS, by placing same in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, on this l ^ d a y of October, 1992, addressed to: 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4 8 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
Slahtask 
gaskill.msor 
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I N THE THIRD J U D I C I A L f t ^ M T C CC-URT" OJ? SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ST. E OF UTAH 
MJBEmA FANNIE^ $ A S K l L L , * •'•'•*• 9 ( * "• : l— ' - '• * -" '-
a k a LEE o r LEA G A S K I L L , ) 
•:•'. . ' . • • V - 3 . U
 r : - - . - ) • • . . . - • . • ) 
P l a i n t i f f , ) Case No. 764923691 
- ) 
v s . 
DON R. G A S K I L L , 
Defendant. 
i •• . . . . _ .... , : ' \ . : : * . 
) MOTION FOR ENTRY'OF 
' ) ••• jWGtfcm ^ M A i W i p p -
) ~ ~ ~ 
) 
- o O o -
i t y^-urKji HI. 
n p p e a r > ?*-.• 
BE- IT '-SfcEtoEMBEREb that on the 2#&» day fc*P Jahfcary, || 
19912y commencing'<at the1 hour of 2:00 p .m. , before 
Commissioner Evai&:>: in ; the abbv^mmiea Court, and that the | 
fol lowing proc&eMngiS W r^%: had. •'•'-- ^nquvrlng as to * he 
.•:•••='.;•..••.. .J !'i.':!f-r?r. • : - . - : i g t ^ o b - "' " ^ - ' ' f ^ " - C^-r , ;- i :• 
..:>:<• :•• # i p pLE^ft- ft A N C E S 
For the Plaintiffs'-5 • "«»• - ufc MSi HELEN"E ." CHRISTIAN ••• . 
A t t o r n e y a t Law 
-- ret ' . t : .cn • Thi td F l o o r / N e w $ o r k B u i l d i n g | 
48 P o s t O f f i c e P l a c e 
;J • :: :>Lr..w-; ' - r cetenft .
 S a i t Lake C i t y ; Utah 84101 
For' t h e Defendant: ' 
£• s r a l l a ifttl i"' -.a** r t * ~ . * 
aMbite t o convey ro a L. 
FUR-. BRENT D. YOUNG 
A t t o r n e y a t Law 
rf <? Svi* * ffttfng 
48 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
fcltt : 
.r.i.:. .i^u t n a t . 
•*j\**r# i s «ij i:i** ^ in t h i s Cotar* 
PENNY C . ABBOTT. C . S . R . 
3 2 4 1 SOUTH 4 8 4 0 WEST 
WEST VALLEY C I T Y / UTAH 8 4 1 2 0 
MtfMff 3£&mA&&& 
-ij;wd,'uJ!«itJiJsi:ict Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DALLAS H. YOUNG, JR. 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
JERRY L. REYNOLDS 
RAY PHILLIPS IVIE* 
SHERMAN C. YOUNG + 
JEFFERY C. PEATROSS 
* A L S O A D M I T T E D IN N E V A D A 
• A L S O A D M I T T E D IN C O L O R A D O 
LAW OFFICES 
IYIE A N D Y O U N G 
A P A R T N E R S H I P I N C L U D I N G A P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T I O N 
48 NORTH UNIVERSITY AVENUE 
P.O. BOX 672 
PROVO, UTAH 84603 
November llf 1992 
DALLAS H. YOUNG (1892-1971) 
RAY HARDING IVIE (1921-1990) 
T E L E P H O N E (801) 375-3000 
T E L E F A X (801) 375-3067 
2366-2 
Appeal©' f i l e 
Y:.-i; , . u.'tosflC* 
^ 
^ 
H\ 
MOV 1 7 1932 
_ ; *.,••.;,.;; w w . * i i 
Ce^uiy Clark 
Honorable James S. Sawaya 
District Court Judge 
Third Judicial District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Re: Gaskill v. Gaskill, District Court Civil No. 764923691DA 
Gaskill v. Gaskill, Court of Appeals Case #920632CA 
Dear Judge Sawaya: 
On November 11, 1992 I received a letter written to the court on 
November 9, 1992 by Helen Christen. I subscribe to the view held 
by some that it is completely inappropriate to conduct the court's 
business through private correspondence. Unfortunately I am 
required to respond in the same fashion to Mrs. Christen's letter 
of November 9, 1992. 
It seems to me that if Mrs. Christen's client is entitled to 
relief, that relief should be solicited pursuant to the Rules of 
Civil Procedure, perhaps by the filing of an appropriate motion to 
which I could respond. 
Sincerely, 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
BDY:mn 
cc: Helen Christen 
I 
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GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
SUITE 722. BOSTON BUILDING 
9 EXCHANGE PLACE 
*ANK j . GUSTIN SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
.EN E.CHRISTIAN TELEPHONE (801) 531-7444 
OF COUNSEL 
)MAS R. GRISLEY 
November 9, 1992 
The Honorable James S. Sawaya 
District Court Judge 
Third Judicial District Court 
240 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: GASKILL v. GASKILL 
Civil No. 764923691DA 
Dear Judge Sawaya: 
In early August, Mr. Young, counsel for Mr. Gaskill, and I, 
representing Mrs. Gaskill, scheduled a telephonic conference with 
you regarding the necessity of scheduling a final hearing in the 
above-referenced action, inasmuch as you had denied Mr. Young's 
objection and affirmed the Commissioner's recommendation. The only 
issue on which the Commissioner's ruling was not dispositive was 
the issue of attorney's fees, which I raised during that telephonic 
conference. Mr. Young indicated that it would be acceptable to him 
if I submitted Affidavits as to fees and you made a ruling 
thereafter as to my client's request for fees. 
On August 17, 1992, I submitted the Affidavits of both my 
client and myself as to the issue of attorney's fees and requested 
that you make your ruling. I subsequently received your minute 
entry dated September 29, 1992, indicating that you could find no 
reservation of the issue of attorney's fees nor any Affidavits in 
that regard. 
I have enclosed copies of the following: 
1. The Findings and Recommended Order wherein the issue of 
attorney's fees "is reserved until further hearing of the Court;" 
2. The Affidavit of Lea Gaskill; and 
3. The Affidavit in Support of Attorney's Fees prepared by 
myself. 
NOV 1 2 1992 
Clerk 
HARLEYW. GUSTIN 
1902-1977 
FACSIMILE 
180I) 531-8685 
..P 
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GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
The Honorable James S. Sawaya 
November 9, 1992 
Page 2 
If this provides you with sufficient information on which to 
make a ruling as to my client's request for attorney's fees, I ask 
that you do so. If I can provide any additional information to 
you, please so advise. 
Thank you for your consideration and courtesy in this regard. 
Respectfully, 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN 
HEC/kjs 
Enc. 
cc: Brent Young (w/out enclosures) 
Lea Gaskill 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ^ — 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH V,
 r 
GASKILL, ALBERTA FANNEY 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
GASKILL, DON R 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. 
D. ATTY. 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 764923691 DA 
DATE 11/12/92 
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK STH 
THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS HAVING BEEN SUBMITTED 
TO THE COURT. COMES NOW THE CC'RT AND GRANTS ATTORNEY FEES TO 
THE PLAINTIFF IN THE SUM OF $1,280 AND COSTS OF $106.76. 
CC: HELEN E. CHRISTIAN J* 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
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23S7MCT CflfiRT 
Third Judicial District 
DEC 2 1992 
0 SALT LAKi- CGUNtY 
* 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247) 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Suite 722 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
mputy Clerk 
STATE OF UTAH 
-ooOoo-
ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL a/k/a 
LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AWARDING 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Civil No, 764923691 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
ooOoo 
This matter having come before the Court on Plaintiff's 
request for attorney's fees reserved pursuant to an earlier Order 
of the Court, Plaintiff, ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL, represented by her 
counsel of record, Helen E. Christian, and Defendant, DON R. 
GASKILL, represented by his counsel of record, Brent D. Young, and 
the Court having reviewed the Affidavits submitted by Plaintiff and 
her counsel, and having reviewed the file and being otherwise fully 
advised in the premises, and having made and entered its Minute 
Entry of November 12, 1992, the Court now hereby makes and enters 
the following Order: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
Plaintiff is awarded and Defendant is ordered to pay to 
Plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of $1,280.00, and costs in 
the amount of $106.76, a totaL sum of $1,386.76. 
DATED this ^? day of ^NovcmBor-, 1992.". ~) 
BY THE COURT i! -
JAMES- SNT SAWAYA 
X.,District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES, by placing 
same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, on this day 
of November, 1992, addressed to: 
Brent D. Young 
IVIE AND YOUNG 
Attorney for Defendant 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
Kay J. Slahtas 
gaekill.ord 
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LOAN 0 
TERM 96 29,655.67 
INTEREST RATE 0.8333% 10.00% 
PAYMENT 450.00 
TOTAL COST 43,200.00 43,200.00 
PERIODS PAYMENT INTEREST PRINCIPAL BALANCE 
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-206.25 
-202.50 
-198.75 
-195.00 
-191.25 
-187.50 
-183.75 
-180.00 
-176.25 
-172.50 
-168.75 
-165.00 
-161.25 
-157.50 
-153.75 
-150.00 
-146.25 
-142.50 
-138.75 
-135.00 
-131.25 
-127.50 
-123.75 
-120.00 
-11&25 
-112.50 
-108.75 
-105.00 
-101.25 
-97.50 
-93.75 
-90.00 
-86.25 
-82.50 
-78.75 
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-71.25 
-67,50 
-63.75 
-60.00 
-56.25 
-52.50 
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556.25 
562.50 
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551.25 
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540.00 
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-30791.25 
-31443.75 
-32092.50 
-32737.50 
-33378.75 
-34016.25 
-34650.00 
-35280.00 
-35906.25 
-36528.75 
-37147.50 
-37762.50 
-38373.75 
-38981.25 
-39585.00 
-40185.00 
-40781.25 
-41373.75 
-41962.50 
-42547.50 
-43128.75 
-43706.25 
-44280.00 
-44850.00 
-45416.25 
-45978.75 
-46537.50 
-47092.50 
-47643.75 
-48191.25 
-48735.00 
-49275.00 
-49811.25 
-50343.75 
-50872.50 
-51397.50 
-51918.75 
-52436.25 
-52950.00 
-53460.00 
-53966.25 
-54468.75 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
LOAN 0 
TERM 96 29,655.67 
INTEREST RATE 0.8333% 10.00% 
PAYMENT 450.00 
TOTAL COST 43,200.00 43,200.00 
PERIODS PAYMENT INTEREST PRINCIPAL BALANCE 
w_ = = =: 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
- ST £± £= £= SS SS ZZ: ZZ ZZ ZZ ~ 22 
450.00 
450.00 
450.00 
450.00 
450.00 
450.00 
450.00 
450.00 
450.00 
450.00 
450.00 
450.00 
450.00 
43200.GO 
=s: = sss£=====^ 
-48.75 
-45.00 
-41.25 
-37.50 
-33.75 
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498.75 
495.00 
491.25 
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453.75 
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